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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Human language, although a powerful source of communication, is not a perfect, error-
free, way of conveying meaning. There is much room for referential ambiguity. For example, in 
situations when referents are absent, the listener must rely on his or her long-term knowledge of 
a mentioned concept to understand what a word means. Often, concepts differ across people, 
especially between children and adults, and this may lead to misunderstandings. For example, as 
shown in Mervis & Mervis (1982), 13-month-old infants may not be able to distinguish between 
different types of cars or between leopards and kitty cats, and mothers adjust their object labeling 
accordingly to avoid misunderstanding (Mervis & Mervis, 1982). Additionally, in English, and 
most other languages of the world, common nouns denote categories of objects, entities and 
events, rather than individual tokens. For example, the word “dog” can refer to a German 
shepherd, to a Scotch terrier, or to a child’s stuffed animal. Therefore, when a speaker uses a 
common noun in speech it can potentially refer to any token of the corresponding category. 
Speakers must therefore determine which of several possible items to which a person is referring. 
In a similar vein, people use pronouns like “it”, “that”, and “one” to refer to objects. Phrases like 
“Can you bring me the cup” or “Can you give it to me?” are potentially ambiguous when the 
speaker does not specify which particular cup is meant or what is meant by “it”. 
An important concept that helps explain how understanding can be achieved between 
different people is the concept of common ground (Clark, 1996). Common ground includes 
“…mutual knowledge, beliefs and assumptions shared by the speaker and the addressees” (Clark, 
Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983). Several sources of information are available to adults for 
establishing and using common ground. One such source is shared linguistic evidence, which is 
what conversational partners experienced or are experiencing being said (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986). This source can be meaningful only if the speaker and the listener have access to the 
shared conventional meanings of words, and references used in the conversation elicit 
comparable sets of representations in the speaker’s and the listener’s mind. Another important 
source is shared perceptual evidence, or what two people jointly experienced or are experiencing 
at the moment. This source of information requires that people track each other’s perceptual 
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experiences and understand that one’s awareness of an object in the perceptual common ground 
depends on one’s prior or current perceptual contact with that object.  
In the current research we investigate young children’s ability to access and use these two 
sources of information in ambiguous communicative situations. Children can have access to 
shared linguistic evidence only if they understand words in their conventional sense as referring 
to categories of related objects rather than to individual tokens. In previous research infants 
demonstrated their understanding of the categorical nature of words from a very young age (9-12 
months), but mostly when the referent objects were in full view. However, much less is known 
about young infants’ understanding of words as category labels when referents are out of view. 
The purpose of the first study is to investigate children’s use of the categorical nature of words 
when interpreting references to absent objects. 
The purpose of the second study is to test children’s understanding of the intonation of a 
request when interpreting ambiguous references to objects. Previous research has shown that 
infants as young as 14-18 months are sensitive to another person’s experience with objects. 
Infants know what’s new (Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello & Haberl, 2003) and what’s old 
to the speaker (Saylor & Ganea, 2007), and use that information in reference resolution. Infants 
also can take into account the previous linguistic context, or what the speaker has been saying 
previously, to interpret ambiguous pronouns like “it” (Ganea & Saylor, 2007). Infants as young 
as 12 months are able to use the direction of the speaker’s voice when the speaker is not visible 
to infer which of the 2 possible referents she is attending to (Rossano, Carpenter & Tomasello, 
2012). In study 2 of the current dissertation we investigate if infants can take into account 
whether a person is excited or not to understand if she is asking about an old or a new object. 
Infants’ use of category label to interpret reference  
Previous research on children’s word learning demonstrated that children acquire 
categorical understanding of words at a very young age. There are indications that children may 
initially overgeneralize or undergeneralize words, but very quickly they correct their initial 
mapping errors and accept conventional word meanings. For example, Bloom (1973) reports that 
her 9-month-old used the word “car” only for moving cars seen from the living room. Barrett 
(1986) reports that a 13-month-old used “dog” for a few weeks solely in response to an eliciting 
question about a picture on his bib. At the same time, Huttenlocher and Smiley (1987) 
demonstrate that overgeneralizations and undergeneralizations disappear quickly after 13 
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months, and most instances of infants’ word production they recorded were appropriate for the 
adult categories.  
Infants’ early understanding of the categorical nature of words has been demonstrated in 
a number of studies. One study reports that 9-11-month-old infants can group objects named 
with the same word into one category (Balaban & Waxman, 1993; Waxman & Leddon, 2011). 
They do not group objects in the same way when they are not named or when they are 
accompanied by a simple tone. Older children extend the meanings of newly learned words 
based on different perceptual information depending on the objects’ ontological kinds (e.g., 
animate or inanimate) (Booth & Waxman, 2003). Booth and Waxman (2003) demonstrated that 
preschoolers use shape alone or both, shape and texture to extend new words depending on 
whether they believe the objects are animate or inanimate. Children in this study relied on 
conceptual information to extend words even if it was put in conflict with perceptual information 
(e.g., an object had eyes but was described as inanimate). Altogether, these studies reflect 
children’s understanding that common nouns are used symbolically to refer to categories of 
objects. 
All studies described above tested children’s word meanings in situations where referents 
were perceptually available to children. It is not clear if children can rely on their understanding 
of the categorical nature of words when referents are out of view. For example, when a child 
hears the word “dog” she might be able to understand that this must be about one of many hairy 
barking four-legged domestic animals. Alternatively, the child can just think of one specific dog 
that is most active in her memory and fail to recognize that the speaker might mean something 
different. The child’s ability to access the right set of representations that are relevant to the 
mentioned category is a first step in understanding absent reference. If a child does not take into 
account multiple potential referents of the announced word comprehension may not be 
successful. 
To investigate infants’ use of category knowledge in reference resolution, in Study I of 
the current investigation, we test infants’ ability to rely on the provided label when searching for 
hidden objects. Infants first hear a word that refers to an object hidden in a box, then they are 
allowed to reach in and find an object that is either the target (a token of the mentioned basic 
category) or one of the three distractor objects (an unrelated object, a token of the same 
superordinate category, or a perceptually similar object). If infants understand absent reference at 
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the categorical level they should be able to recognize target objects as the correct referents (they 
will stop searching after having found the target) and reject distractor objects as incorrect ones 
(search again for another object after having found something wrong). We predict that it will be 
more difficult for infants to reject distractors that match the target objects categorically or 
perceptually.  
Infants’ understanding of ambiguous requests for objects 
The focus of the second study in this research is infants’ ability to track people’s 
experiences with objects and to use the intonation of the request to infer if the speaker means to 
refer to a new or a familiar object. Previous investigations of infants’ behavior in ambiguous 
reference situations (two or more objects are potential referents of a verbal request) indicate that 
infants beginning at 12 months are able to keep track of people’s experiences with objects and 
rely on this information to identify the target (Saylor & Ganea, 2007; Saylor, Ganea & Vazquez, 
2011). However, in some studies infants infer that the ambiguous request is about a familiar 
object, while in other studies, on the opposite, they interpret the request as about a new object. 
For example, in Saylor and Ganea (2007) two experimenters played one at a time with 14-18-
month-old infants, each with her own ball. At test, when both balls were present, one of the 
experimenters came back and asked the child ambiguously “Give me the ball”. Most children 
picked the ball that the experimenter previously played with. In comparison to this, in a similar 
ambiguous reference situation in Tomasello and Haberl (2003) 12- and 18-month-old infants 
selected a new object over the familiar one as the intended referent. In this study, infants played 
with two experimenters with two toys. A third toy was introduced to them while one of the 
experimenters was absent. At test, while all three toys were on the tray, the experimenter who 
did not see the third toy showed great excitement (Oh, wow! Look at that! Look at that!) and 
asked the infants ambiguously “Give it to me, please!” Infants selected the toy that the 
experimenter had not seen before assuming she wants the new object. Why did infants pick the 
familiar object in one study and the new object in the other?  
In Study 2 we investigate the possibility that this discrepancy may be explained by 
infants’ understanding of the intonation of the request. If children can switch from picking an old 
object to picking a new object depending on whether the speaker is excited or not this would 
suggest that in addition to tracking the speaker’s experience with objects they can also rely on 
the speaker’s intonation to interpret ambiguous reference.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
WORD COMPREHENSION GUIDES INFANTS’ SEARCH FOR HIDDEN OBJECTS 
 
Introduction 
Adult linguistic communication to a large extent consists of discussing topics that are not 
physically manifested in the conversational context. Adults often exchange information about the 
past and the future, about the non-visible, hypothetical or non-existent. Young children’s ability 
to understand references to absent or invisible entities is a pivotal accomplishment as it extends 
learning opportunities beyond the limits of present and observable things and phenomena. 
Absent reference comprehension opens the possibility of acquiring knowledge from testimony 
which to a great extent shapes children’s cognitive development. At the same time, absent 
reference comprehension itself strongly depends on children’s cognitive development. Children’s 
ability to call the appropriate set of representations to mind and hold them in working memory in 
response to absent reference is a necessary skill that supports their understanding of language. 
The focus of the current study is the role of category label knowledge in children’s 
interpretations of references to absent objects. 
Previous research on absent reference understanding shows that this skill emerges around 
1 year of age (Ganea, 2005; Huttenlocher, 1974; Miller, et al., 1980; Saylor & Baldwin, 2004; 
Saylor, 2004). In a typical paradigm, infants play with an object, than it is removed from view, 
and after a time delay it is mentioned again. Infants’ ability to orient to the referent’s location, 
point at it or approach it is taken as a sign of their comprehension of labeling an absent object. In 
a paradigm like this, infants as young as 10.5-11 months can turn around to look at the 
mentioned toy if it’s close to them. Older, 14-month-old infants can point, look or walk towards 
the referent’s hiding location.  At 16 months, infants can go and search for the referent in another 
room.  
Across multiple studies, it has been shown that infants’ absent reference understanding 
may be influenced by their memory of the referent and its location. The youngest infants are best 
able to respond to requests about absent entities in contexts that support the retrieval and 
maintenance of the target representation. Infants are more likely to respond to names of highly 
familiar absent referents, after short time delays and in the presence of reminders of the absent 
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referents. For example, infants show comprehension of references to absent familiar people 
before for absent objects. In Gallerani et al. (2009), 11-month-old infants showed understanding 
of their parent’s name when the parent played with them in the lab and then stepped out of the 
testing room. When the absent person was mentioned (e.g., “Where is the daddy?”) infants 
looked, pointed or approached the door. They did not show similar comprehension behaviors for 
familiar objects (e.g., a ball or phone). In other studies, 13-14 months have been shown to 
engage in the same type of behaviors in response to references to absent objects (Ganea, 2005; 
Saylor, 2004). Infants are also more likely to understand references for familiar versus unfamiliar 
people. In Ganea & Saylor (2012), 13-month-old babies responded to a familiar person (a 
sibling), but not to an unfamiliar absent person they recently met. 
Infants’ comprehension is also affected by the length of time the referent had been away. 
In Ganea and Saylor (2013) 13-month-old infants were able to respond to the name of a familiar 
person when he/she was absent for 2 minutes, but not when for 16 minutes. Older, 16-month-old 
infants were able to respond after both a 2-minute and 16-minute delays. In a different study, 
Ganea (2005) found that 13-14-month-old infants responded to the mention of an absent toy by 
searching for it if it had been absent for 5 minutes, but they were less likely to do so if the toy 
had been absent for 15 minutes.  
Several findings suggest that infants’ comprehension can be supported by reminding 
them of the referent during the delay by different visual and verbal means. In Ganea (2005), 13-
14-month-old infants were introduced to a stuffed animal and taught its name. Infants who 
during the delay listened to a story containing the toy’s name looked, pointed or searched for the 
target object more often than infants who listened to a story containing a different name. In 
Saylor (2004), both, 12- and 16-month-old infants revealed their comprehension of absent 
reference by looking and gesturing more to the referent’s prior location than to the distractor 
object’s location if the locations were marked by the displays matching the colors of the absent 
objects. 
Young infants are also more likely to respond to absent reference if the referent is 
associated with the conversational context. If infants see the referent in the context where they 
are later asked about it, different elements of the context can remind them of the absent referent 
and support their comprehension. Contextual associations are very important to infants, and 
when infants are asked about an absent familiar entity that they had never seen in the testing 
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environment, they are unlikely to show comprehension. In Saylor & Baldwin (2004) infants 
younger than 15 months did not display any comprehension of the mention of their absent parent 
(e.g., daddy) when the parent did not accompany them to the lab. However, in Gallerani et al. 
(2009) and Ganea & Saylor (2012) a family member was taken to the lab, and infants of 11 and 
13 months displayed comprehension by searching for them when they were mentioned while 
being absent. 
In previous absent reference research infants’ successful responding required them not 
only to bring to mind the mentioned hidden object, but also to remember the referent’s location. 
Hence, many studies demonstrate that the characteristics of the referent’s hiding location do 
appear to play a significant role in infants’ ability to display comprehension. For example, the 
youngest infants’ comprehension is limited to most proximal and accessible objects and people 
(Huttenlocher, 1974; Ganea, 2005). In Ganea (2005), 14-month-old infants were less likely to 
respond to the name of an absent object when its location was not immediately visible and 
accessible (a toy in the basket behind a couch) compared to when the object’s location was 
accessible and in full view (a toy in the basket in front of the couch). Older infants become 
increasingly able to search for more distal referents located in a different room or in a different 
building (Huttenlocher, 1974; Saylor & Baldwin, 2004). It is only by age 2 that their 
comprehension expands to topics free of physical locations and embodied existence (Miller et 
al., 1980; Saylor, 2004; Swingley & Fernald, 2002).  
The importance of location information in infants’ absent reference understanding is 
suggested by a number of other studies, exploring both, comprehension and production 
(Adamson & Bakeman, 2006; Morford & Goldin-Meadow, 1997; Osina, Saylor & Ganea, 2013, 
2014; Sachs, 1983; Snow et al., 1996). For example, older children (16-19 months) who already 
can refer to and respond to the names of not immediately available referents still depend on their 
memory for the referent’s location when understanding absent reference. Huttenlocher (1974) 
observed that infants who can go to a different room to search for a mentioned object mostly do 
it for large pieces of furniture that occupy permanent locations. The stability of the referent’s 
location helps infants remember where the referent is and this appears to support their 
comprehension abilities. Objects’ locations (“e.g., “where is the <…>?”)  remain the main topic 
of infants’ own talk about the absent at this stage as well (Morford & Goldin-Meadow, 1997; 
Sachs, 1983). 
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A special role of object location in children’s communication about the absent is also 
suggested by observations of deaf children. This research suggests that referents’ habitual 
locations can be used in a symbolic way, to stand for the target object. For example, the deaf 
child whose displaced communication is described in Butcher, Mylander & Goldin-Meadow 
(1991) could point at the location associated with the intended referent to bring the referent to the 
listener’s mind. The child pointed at the chair where his dad usually sits to refer to the absent dad 
or at the corner where they usually put a Christmas tree to convey something about celebrating 
Christmas. Location as a symbol, or a placeholder for an absent object, can be also used by 
young hearing children to request a desired object that is associated with that location 
(Liszkowski et al., 2009).  
Altogether, these findings provide strong evidence for the role of infants’ memory of the 
concrete object and its location in their comprehension. What is not clear from the previous 
research is whether infants truly understood the word as potentially referring to multiple tokens 
of the target category and then made an inference about which one they were being asked about, 
or they simply oriented reflexively to the remembered location of the specific recently seen 
object. Research by Kirkham et al. (2012) demonstrated that infants as young as 6 months can 
bind auditory, visual and spatial information in complex multimodal events. They orient to the 
remembered location of an object when they hear a sound associated with that object, because 
the sound, the object and its location are all parts of one complex multimodal event. Infants’ 
responses in absent reference tasks can be explained by a similar low-level process of spatially 
indexing absent objects and orienting to their locations in response to the associated sound 
forms.  
In the current study, we investigate infants’ ability to use category labels when 
interpreting references to absent objects. The task was designed such that infants cannot use an 
active memory trace of a recent object in its’ specific location to understand the reference. They 
have to use their categorical understanding of words knowledge to appropriately respond to 
absent reference. Infants first hear a name of an object hidden in a box and are asked to find it, 
and then they are allowed to reach inside and retrieve it. On some trials they retrieve a target 
object (a token of the mentioned basic category), while on other targets they find a distractor 
object. We expected infants to reach back into the box to find another object more often on 
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distractor trials than on target trials. Infants’ long-term categorical knowledge of the mentioned 
words is required for them to recognize the targets and to reject the distractors.  
To further investigate infants’ use of category labels in reference resolution we compare 
their performance with different types of distractors: unrelated objects, related objects (tokens of 
the same superordinate category) and perceptually similar objects. Previous research on toddler 
language comprehension (18-24 months) suggests that it is more difficult for children to reject 
distractor objects that are related categorically or perceptually to the targets because they likely 
activate categorical and perceptual information when hearing words (Arias-Trejo & Plunkett, 
2009; Arias-Trejo & Plunkett, 2010; Johnson & Huettig, 2011; Johnson, McQueen & Huettig, 
2011; Mani, et al., in press; Styles & Plunkett, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that infants in the 
current study have a harder time rejecting distractors that are close categorically or similar 
perceptually to the targets. 
 
Experiment I 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 32 healthy full-term infants with normal hearing and from English-
speaking families. Half were 16 months old (range 14 months 19 days – 18 months 3 days, mean 
16 months 7 days; 9 girls) and half were 20 months old (range 19 months 1 day – 21 months 18 
days; mean 20 months 5 days; 8 girls). One additional 16-month-old child participated, but was 
omitted due to being upset and refusing to participate. Participants for this and all subsequent 
experiments were primarily Caucasian and from middle class families. They were recruited from 
the Greater Nashville area by phone from a database of interested families. 
Materials 
Stimulus objects were hidden in a felt covered box measuring 35x12x8 cm with an 8x4 
cm. opening on each side covered by spandex. Small graspable objects from familiar object 
categories were used during the study. The objects were: a toy spoon, a car, a bottle, a shoe, an 
apple, a cup, a banana, a diaper, a toy plastic dog, toy keys, a rubber duck, and a ball. Parents 
were given a list of the names of these objects and were asked to choose which their child 
understood most well. Based on this report, 4 experimental objects were chosen such that the 
child knew the labels for both the targets and distractors, and such that in each distractor-target 
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pair the objects do not share any perceptual features like color and shape, did not belong to the 
same category (like apple-banana), and did not start with the same sound (like dog and duck). 
Infants in both age groups were reported to know a sufficient number of words to make such 
pairings. See Appendix A for the summary of items used in Experiments 1-3.  
The experiment was recorded from 2 viewpoints using 2 cameras. One camera recorded 
infants from the front to enable coding looking behavior and facial expression. The second 
camera recorded the experiment from the child’s right side to enable coding reaching behavior. 
Procedure 
In this and all subsequent experiments the procedure was as follows. Infants were tested 
individually in the lab. They were seated on their parents’ lap across the table from the 
experimenter. To assure that parents did not inadvertently influence their infants’ behavior 
parents were asked to wear a specially designed visor that prevented them from watching the 
experiment. An assistant sat on the floor to the left of the experimenter. The assistant’s role was 
to put objects inside the box for the experimenter. This was necessary to avoid disruptions in the 
experimenter-child interaction and not to attract the child’s attention to the bucket with the 
objects that was hidden under the table.  
Familiarization phase 
Once everyone was seated, the experimenter began the first phase of the experiment - 
familiarization. The purpose of this phase was to familiarize the child with the box and teach 
her/him to reach inside to find toys. During the familiarization, the experimenter first showed the 
box to the child, demonstrating that it had 2 openings and that one could reach inside. Then she 
put the box on her lap where the child did not see it, saying: “Let’s see what’s in the box!” The 
assistant put 2 objects in the box that were not going to be used during the experiment. The 
familiarization objects were from the pool of objects listed above, and they varied from child to 
child. The familiarization objects were never named by the experimenter to avoid overloading 
the child with object labels.  
The experimenter put the box on the table, pushed it toward the child and encouraged the 
child to reach inside to get a toy out by saying “Look, <child’s name>, there is something in the 
box! Do you want to find it? Find a toy!” If the child did not reach on her own, the experimenter 
took one of the objects out through the child-facing opening. After the child has explored the 
object for some time (about 30 seconds), the experimenter told the child that there was 
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something else in the box and encouraged the child to find the other object. Most infants found 
the second object on their own. If they did not reach inside the second time, the experimenter 
took the object out herself. The child was allowed to explore the objects, put them back into the 
box and take them out again. Either 3 minutes later or after the child lost interest in the first pair 
of objects, the experimenter took the objects from the child and put them on the floor under the 
table. She put the box on her lap again and the assistant put 2 more objects for the child to 
practice with. The procedure was repeated with the second pair of objects.  
Test phase 
At the end of the familiarization phase, the experimenter took the objects and the box 
from the child separately to make sure the child understood that the box was now empty. She put 
the objects under the table and put the box on her lap. At the beginning of the test phase, she 
said: “Let’s see what else is in the box!” while the assistant was hiding the first experimental 
object in the box. There was always only one object on each of the experimental trials. Once the 
object was inside, the experimenter put the box on the table, holding it close to herself to prevent 
the child from reaching and said: “<Child’s name>, I have an apple in there! Yes, an apple! Find 
the apple!” She pushed the box towards the child to allow her/him to reach inside. If the child did 
not reach inside, the experimenter repeated the request: “Find the apple!” On 29 trials (equally 
distributed across the three experiments and age groups) a child would not reach inside at all or 
reached, but could not find the object if it rolled too far back or sideways. The experimenter then 
helped the child find it either by inserting her hand in the box from her side and moving the 
object closer to the child’s hand inside the box, or just took the object out of the box from the 
child-facing opening and gave it to the child.  
She then waited for the child to explore the object. This exploration period was also the 
interval during which infants could choose to reach back into the box if they detected a mismatch 
between the object they retrieved and the item that they were told was in the box. The main 
dependent measure was whether infants’ reached back in the box during this period. The trials 
terminated in one of the following 2 ways: 1) an infant put an object in the box after having 
explored it and pushed the box back to the experimenter; 2) the experimenter waited for the child 
to explore the object and reach back for another one, and then took the box and the object from 
the child whether the child had reached back or not. At the end of the trials the experimenter put 
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the object under the table and put the box on her lap. The procedure was repeated with 3 other 
objects, making it 4 experimental trials total.  
During the experimental trials the experimenter maintained eye contact with the child. 
She did not name the objects once they were visible and just smiled at the infant if (s)he showed 
an object to her or named it. The duration of trials (from the moment an infant was allowed to 
reach in the box to the moment the experimenter took an object and the box away from the 
infant) varied from trial to trial and from infant to infant. This happened because sometimes 
infants terminated the trials themselves by putting the object in the box and pushing the box 
away, and such trials were therefore shorter, or because infants sometimes reached back into the 
box for another object after having found the first one, and such trials lasted longer for this 
reason. An average trial length across the 3 experiments was 19.86 seconds (SD = 8.43 sec). We 
return to a discussion of trail length after Experiment 3.  
Design  
In this and all subsequent experiments, the 4 experimental trials were blocked by label. 
Thus, each child heard 2 labels, each label occurred 2 times in a row. For each label, infants once 
found the target object and once a distractor. For example, the experimenter said there was a 
spoon inside and a child found a spoon on the target trial. Once the spoon was taken from the 
child and out of view and the assistant put in a distractor object, the experimenter said again 
there was a spoon inside and the child found a different object (e.g., a toy car). The order of 
target and distractor trials was counterbalanced for each label. Thus each participant had two 
types of trial sequences: target-distractor, and distractor-target. Whether the target-distractor or 
the distractor-target sequence came first was counterbalanced across participants. 
Coding 
1. Searching for another object 
In this and all subsequent experiments, the main measure was whether infants searched 
again in the box on distractor trials more often than on target trials. If an infant took out one 
object, put it on the table, and then inserted her empty hand in the box it was coded as searching 
again for another object. On 2 occasions (Experiment 1) infants put aside the retrieved object and 
instead of reaching with their hands they peeked inside the box through the spandex opening. 
This was also coded as searching again for another object. On 8 trials (5 distractor and 3 target 
trials), infants first put the retrieved object back into the box, then took their hand out, and 
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reached back again (Experiment 1, 2 in each age group, Experiment 2, 2 in the 20-month-old 
group and 1 in the 16-month-old group, and 1 in Experiment 3). Such behavior is ambiguous and 
could be interpreted as reaching again to get the first toy out or reaching back to find another 
object. On some occasions the persistence of infants’ search (how long they have been searching 
and how far they inserted their hand in the box) suggested they were trying to find a second 
object, because they left the first one right at the spandex opening. On some occasions they 
would take the first object out right away suggesting they were just playing with the box and the 
toy. Such ambiguous instances were coded as searching back for another object or not based on 
the coder’s impression of what infants were doing. On 21 trials evenly spread across all 
experiments (both distractor and target, representing 6.7% of all trials) infants inserted their hand 
into the box holding the retrieved object and took their hand out without letting it go. Such 
occasions were not treated as searching back for another object. If a child reached out with her 
hand, touched the spandex cover on the box opening, but did not insert their hand any further this 
was not coded as searching back.  
Infants were scored “0” for trials on which they did not reach back and “1” for trials on 
which infants searched back. Muted video recordings were analyzed by an independent coder 
blind to the trial type: 90.6% of the trials from Experiment 1 (both age groups), 94% from 
Experiment 2 (both age groups), and 100% in Experiment 3. Overall agreement on whether a 
search for another object occurred or not was high: on 95.7% of the trials in Experiment 1 
(Cohen’s kappa = 0.91), on 93.5% in Experiment 2 (Cohen’s kappa = 0.87), on 90% in 
Experiment 3 (Cohen’s kappa = 0.77). 
2. Exploratory analysis of infants’ behavior 
In addition to the main measure of infants’ word comprehension we performed the 
following exploratory analyses of infants’ reaction to the experimenter’s reference and to the 
retrieved objects.  
1) Verbal behavior (object label production) 
We coded the following instances of infants’ labeling the objects during the experimental 
trials. First, we were interested in whether infants repeated the reference after the experimenter 
while initially reaching in the box. We also coded if infants named the objects after having found 
them. Next, we coded instances of mislabeling distractor objects: it happened sometimes if 
infants were repeating the experimenter’s reference after having retrieved a distractor object. 
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Last, we coded if the infants were able to correct their mislabeling of a distractor object by 
producing the right label. 
2) Object exploration 
We coded the actions infants produced on the retrieved objects, specifically, the actions 
that corresponded to the object’s function and category membership (category-specific actions). 
Some examples of category-specific actions include rolling the car, drinking from the bottle, 
trying to bite the apple etc. General actions like mouthing the objects or dropping them on the 
floor that could be done with any kind of toy were not recorded. We report the actions that 
reflected infants’ recognition of the objects’ functions and category membership.  
3) Looking behavior 
To investigate infants’ reaction at the target and distractor objects we coded the duration 
of infants’ first look at the retrieved objects. As a measure of infants’ social behavior we also 
coded whether they looked at the mom or at the experimenter right after looking at the retrieved 
object. 
Results and discussion 
1.  Searching for another object 
 The purpose of this experiment was to investigate infants’ ability to use a category label 
in interpreting references to absent objects. Infants first heard a reference to an object inside the 
box and then were allowed to retrieve an object. We predicted that infants would be more likely 
to search again in the box to find another object on distractor trials (when they retrieved a 
different object than what the experimenter had mentioned) than on target trials. Results are 
displayed in Figure 1. A Generalized Estimating Equation model with probit link was run 
predicting infants’ reaching back from trial type, age and their interaction. Trial type and age 
were dummy coded first, with 20-month-olds and distractor trials as reference categories, and 
second with 16-month-olds and distractor trials as reference categories. The analysis showed that 
20-month-old infants searched on 59.4% of distractor trials (b0 = 0.24, χ
2
(1) = 0.83, p = 0.36, 
95% CI [-0.27; 0.75]). They were significantly less likely to reach back on target trials (46.9%) 
than on distractor trials (b1 = -1.39, χ
2
(1) = 10.89, p < 0.001, 95% CI [-2.21; -0.56]). There was 
no significant difference in the rates of reaching back on distractor trials between 20 and 16-
month-olds (b2 = -0.08, χ
2
(1) = 0.05, p = 0.82, 95% CI [-0.784; 0.624]). The age by trial 
interaction was not significant, meaning that the difference in infants’ performance on target vs. 
15 
 
distractor trials was not smaller in the younger group comparing to the older group (b3 = 0.56, 
χ2(1) = 1.03, p = 0.31, 95%, CI [-0.518; 1.629]).  
Next, to investigate 16-month-old infants’ performance on distractor vs. target trials we 
changed the reference category from 20-month-olds to 16-month-olds. Sixteen-month-old infants 
reached back on 56.2% of distractor trials (b0 = 0.1573, χ
2
(1) = 0.4, p = 0.5253, 95% CI [-0.328; 
0.643]). They were significantly less likely to search back on target trials (31.2%) than on 
distractor trials (b1 = -0.83, χ
2
(1) = 5.62, p < 0.05, 95% CI [-1.519; -0.144]). There were no sex 
or order effects. 
 
Figure 1. Proportion of trials infants reached back into the box to find another object. 
To guard against the possibility that differences in infants’ behavior on target trials and 
distractor trials was prompted by the experimenter’s behavior, a coder naïve to trial type watched 
muted video recordings (90.6%) and tried to guess trial type based on the experimenter’s 
behavior. The coder was told that each child had 2 target trials and 2 distractor trials, but was 
naïve to the order of the trials. The coder could correctly guess trial type on 50.9% of the coded 
trials, which is not different from chance level (binomial test, p = 0.9). Whether the coder 
correctly guessed distractor trials was not related to whether a child reached back on those trials 
or not (Logistic regression, b = 0.34, Z = 0.76, p = 0.44). This suggests that infants’ behavior was 
not biased by the experimenter.  
Higher rates of reaching back into the box to find another object on distractor trials than 
on target trials suggest that infants were able to recognize target objects they had never seen 
before as the correct referents and that they were able to recognize the distractor objects as not 
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belonging to the right set of referent objects. This suggests that infants are able to use category 
label to interpret absent reference, and their understanding does not require a memory of a 
particular token in its specific location. 
2. Exploratory analysis of infants’ behavior 
To further investigate infants’ reaction to the announced words and their reaction to the 
retrieved objects we coded 100% of trials for 16-month-olds and 94% of trials for 20-month-olds 
(the experiment was not taped for 1 participant) with respect to various verbal and non-verbal 
behaviors infants produced during the experimental trials. See summary in Table 1. 
1) Verbal behavior (object label production) 
Coding of infants’ verbal behavior revealed that infants in both groups occasionally 
named the objects they found in the box. In the older group, naming occurred on 45% of the 
trials (often more than once on the same trial), about equally often on target and distractor trials. 
In the younger group, naming occurred less often, only on 12.5% of trials, and all but one on 
target trials. On rare occasions (17% of trials in the older group and 4.7% in the younger), infants 
rehearsed the label provided by the experimenter either during the initial search in the box or 
during the secondary search after having realized they found something wrong. Interestingly, on 
43.8% (7 out of 16) of the distractor trials on which labeling occurred older infants repeated the 
label produced by the experimenter when already exploring the retrieved object and this actually 
lead them to mislabeling the object in hands. On 3 occasions of mislabeling infants corrected 
themselves. For example, when the experimenter said there was an apple inside and a child 
found a shoe instead, she said “Apple! Apple! Apple! No… Shoe!” In the younger group 
mislabeling on distractor trials occurred only once. Infants’ verbal behavior provides additional 
evidence that infants often recognized objects for what they were, and their reactions to the 
retrieved objects was guided by their word comprehension.  
2) Object exploration 
Coding of infants’ object exploration showed that infants sometimes produced category-
specific actions when exploring the toys they found in the box. Some examples of such actions 
include rolling the car, drinking from the cup and the bottle, shaking the bottle, bouncing the 
ball, trying to bite the banana and the apple, eating or digging with the spoon. Such behaviors 
occurred on 37% of the coded trials in the older group (both target and distractor) and on 12.5% 
of the coded trials in the younger group (both target and distractor). Such behavior may suggest 
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that many infants were mostly able to recognize objects for what they were. However, it’s 
important to point out that such behavior could have been driven by object affordances and not 
reflect infants’ higher-level understanding of what the objects were. Additionally, we can not be 
sure that infants who did not produce this behavior were not able to recognize the objects. It’s 
possible that they just did not want to play with these objects. Despite the uncertainty about the 
interpretation of such behavior it can be used to compare infants’ object exploration across the 3 
experiments. 
3) Looking behavior 
To investigate infants’ immediate reaction at the retrieved objects we coded the duration 
of infants’ initial look at the retrieved objects. We expected that infants may be surprised at 
finding wrong objects on the distractor trials which will be manifested in longer looking at the 
distractor objects than at target objects. In the older group, we found the opposite: 20-month-old 
infants’ initial look at distractor objects tended to be quicker than their look at the target objects, 
although the difference was only marginally significant (M(target) = 5.09 sec., SD = 3.5 sec., 
M(distractor) = 4.04 sec., SD = 1.9 sec., paired t-test, t(31) = 1.74, p = 0.09). One potential 
explanation for this is that older infants quickly recognized the mismatch between the 
experimenter’s reference and the retrieved objects on distractor trials, while they concentrated on 
exploring the objects longer on target trials. In the younger age group this difference did not 
emerge (M(target) = 4.37 sec., SD = 2.4, M(distractor) = 4.55 sec., SD = 4, paired t-test, t(31) = 
0.28, p = 0.78).  
Further investigation of infants’ looking patterns revealed that infants often looked back 
at the experimenter after their initial look at the object (very rarely they looked at their parent 
instead of the experimenter). This behavior was observed on 57% of trials in the older group and 
on 93% of trials in the younger group, and equally often on target and distractor trials. This 
suggests that infants in both age groups were sensitive to the social component of the interaction 
and often reestablished eye contact with the experimenter after having initially explored the 
retrieved objects.  
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Table 1. Exploratory analysis of infants’ behavior. 
 Naming 
object in 
hands 
Mislabeling on 
the distractor 
trials 
Rehearsing 
the label 
while 
reaching 
Object 
exploration 
Duration 
of 1
st
 look 
Looking back 
at the 
experimenter 
20 months 45%, 
both T 
and D 
trials 
43.8% of the D 
trials where the 
naming 
occurred (7/16) 
17%, both 
on T and D 
trials 
37% of T 
and D trials 
Mean T = 
5.09(3.5) 
57% of T and 
D trials 
Mean D = 
4.04(1.9) 
16 months 12.5%, 
mostly 
on T 
trials 
1.56% only 1 
instance 
4.7%, both 
on T and D 
trials 
12.5% of T 
and D trials 
Mean T = 
4.37(2.4) 
93% of T and 
D trials 
Mean D = 
4.55(4.0) 
To summarize, this experiment demonstrates that infants at 16 and 20 months are able to 
understand absent reference based on their knowledge of category labels and without relying on 
their memory of a particular recently seen token of the category and its specific location. Their 
language comprehension is sufficient for them to recognize familiar but never seen before 
objects as targets and to reject distractors as objects not belonging to the category mentioned by 
the researcher. In addition, at both ages they showed some understanding of the social aspect of 
communication. First, infants frequently looked back at the experimenter after having found an 
object to check on her reaction. Second, they were able to make an inference that there must be a 
different object inside the box if they did not find the object the experimenter was referring to on 
distractor trials.  
In the next two experiments we investigate infants’ ability to reject distractor objects that 
are similar to the target objects categorically (Experiment 2) and visually (Experiment 3). Arias-
Trejo and Plunkett (2010) suggest that perceptual similarity and category membership of 
distractor objects interfere with referent identification both in toddlers and adults. In their study, 
target identification was slower and less accurate when the distractor was similar perceptually or 
categorically, or both, compared to when it was unrelated and visually dissimilar. Additionally, 
research on adults’ factual error detection shows that people are more prone to accept incorrect 
statements if the incorrect entity is conceptually related to the correct entity (e.g., Moses instead 
of Noah as a person who build the arc, Erickson & Mattson, 1981). In the next 2 experiments 
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infants are tested with distractor objects drawn from the same global category, but visually 
dissimilar (Experiment 2), and with perceptually similar distractors, but not related to targets 
categorically (Experiment 3).  
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Seventeen 20-month-old infants (range 19 months 8 days – 21 months 9 days; mean 20 
months 4 days, 13 girls) and 16 16-month-old infants (mean = 15 months 25 days, range 15 
months 24 days – 16 months 14 days; 10 girls) participated. Participants were recruited as in 
Experiment 1. 
Materials and design 
Six objects from the Experiment 1 set were used and two new objects were added: an 
infants’ sock and infants’ pants to make 4 pairs of categorically related, but visually dissimilar 
items: apple-banana, bottle-cup, shoe-sock and diaper-pants (see pictures in Appendix B). The 
paired objects were from the same global category, but looked distinct from each other. For 
example, banana and apple are both fruit, but banana is long and yellow, while apple is round 
and red.  
Two pairs were selected for each child to be tested with based on which words their 
parents reported as known. For 16-month-olds occasionally the list of words reported as “known 
best” by the parents did not include all words from our “matched distractor” set. On such cases 
preference was given to infants’ knowledge of target labels in constructing distractor-target pairs. 
For example, if a parent checked the word “banana” in the list, but not the word “apple” the child 
would be asked to find the banana, and the apple served as a distractor. Procedure, design and 
coding were the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Results and discussion 
1. Reaching back for another object 
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate if infants can reject distractor objects 
that are categorically related, but perceptually dissimilar. Infants’ performance in this task 
depends on their recognition that distractor objects are categorically related. If infants recognize 
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the similarity between the retrieved distractor objects and the objects they were told were in the 
box it should be more difficult for infants to reject such distractors. Thus we should see lower 
rates of reaching back in this experiment.  
The analysis of infants’ rates of reaching back to find another object in this experiment 
confirmed the prediction, but only for the younger group of infants (see Figure 2). A GEE model 
(probit link) was run following the same strategy as in Experiment 1. Older, 20-month-old 
infants searched back on 67.7% of distractor trials (b0 = 0.458,  χ
2
(1) = 3.97, p < 0.01, 96% CI 
[0.007; 0.9]). They were significantly (50.1%) less likely to search on target trials (b1 = -1.39, 
χ2(1) = 20.54, p < 0.0001, 95% CI [-1.99; -0.787]). Younger, 16-month-old infants, were 
significantly (36.5%) less likely to reach back on distractor trials than 20-month-olds (b2 = -0.95, 
χ2(1) = 7.91, p < 0.01, 95% CI [-1.6; -0.29]). Finally, there was a significant age by trial 
interaction (b3 = -0.95, χ
2
(1) = 7.91, p < 0.01, 95% CI [0.33; 2.07]) meaning that the difference 
in rates of reaching back on distractor and target trials was larger for 20-month-olds than for 16-
months-olds. Indeed, 16-month-old infants reached back on 31.2% of distractor trials (b0 = -0.49, 
χ2(1) = 3.96, p > 0.05, 95% CI [-0.97; -0.007]). They were not much less likely to reach back on 
target trials (b1 = -0.19, χ
2
(1) = 0.34, p = 0.56, 95% CI [-0.82; 0.44]). There were no sex or order 
effects. 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of trials infants reached back into the box to find another object. 
To ensure that 20-month-old infants’ behavior was not influenced by the experimenter we 
asked a coder naïve to trial type to watch muted tapes (88% of the trials) and guess trial type 
based on the experimenter’s behavior. The coder could correctly guess 53% of the trials, which 
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is not more than predicted by chance (Binomial test, p = 0.7). This suggests that infants’ 
behavior cannot be explained by the experimenter’s behavior.  
To summarize, these results show that older, 20-month-old infants reached back on 
distractor trials significantly more often than on target trials, like in Experiment 1. Younger, 16-
month-old infants no longer showed this pattern. They reached on distractor trials much less 
often than 20-month-old infants, and not more often than on target trials. To further investigate 
older infants’ reaction to categorically matched distractors we compared the latency of reaching 
back on distractor trials in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 for 20 month olds. We coded the 
duration of time between the moment infants retrieved an object from the box (it was in full 
view) and the moment they initiated reaching back (they raised their hand to reach in). This 
coding was performed only for the distractor trials on which infants reached back. Although the 
latency of reaching back in Experiment 1 tended to be larger comparing to that in Experiment 2, 
the difference did not reach significance (M (Exp. 1) = 9.53 sec., SD = 5.72, M (Exp. 2) = 7.81, 
SD = 3.66, Welch t-test, 2-sided, t(27.7) = 1.1, p = 0.28). 
2. Exploratory analysis of infants’ behavior 
 Like in Experiment 1, we coded infants’ reaction to the retrieved objects (83% of the 
trials for 20-month-olds and 100% of the trials for 16-month-olds). Below we report infants’ 
production of object labels, object exploration patterns, and looking behavior. See summary in 
Table 2. 
1) Verbal behavior (object label production) 
Coding infants’ verbal behavior revealed that in the older group infants named the objects 
in hands on 28.6% of the coded trials, both on distractor and target trials. Like in Experiment 1, 
naming was less frequent in the younger group – 7.81% of the trials, both target and distractor. 
As in Experiment 1, infants occasionally rehearsed the label after the experimenter while 
searching in the box. This occurred only in the older group on 19.7% of the coded trials, both 
target and distractor. Younger infants in this experiment never repeated the experimenter’s 
reference before seeing an object. In the older group, rehearsing the label after the experimenter 
sometimes led to infants mislabeling a distractor object after they had retrieved it already. This 
occurred on 5 out of 8 instances (62.5%) when infants named the objects on distractor trials. For 
example, one child was repeating after the experimenter: “Find shoe! Shoe!” She said “shoe” 
after having found a sock, then said “socky” several times, then said “shoe” again and reached 
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back into the box. In the younger group there was only 1 instance of mislabeling, and it occurred 
on a target trial: the child was told there was an apple inside, he retrieved an apple and said 
“nana” (banana). 
2) Object exploration 
Coding of infants’ object exploration patters revealed that infants sometimes performed 
the following category-specific actions: trying to bite the apple and the banana, trying to drink 
from the cup and the bottle, trying to put the sock and the shoe on foot. Actions like putting the 
sock and the shoe in mouth or putting pants or the diaper on head were not considered in this 
analysis. Category-specific actions occurred on 26.8% of trials in the older group and on 31.2% 
trials in the younger group. These actions were equally often on target and distractor trials. 
Interestingly, in the younger groups category-specific actions occurred more often in Experiment 
2 than in Experiment 1 (12.5%). This suggests that infants were not less engaged with the objects 
in this experiment compared to Experiment 1. 
3) Looking behavior 
Coding the duration of infants’ initial look at the retrieved object on target vs. distractor 
trials showed that 20-month-old infants spent less time looking at distractor objects than on 
target objects before looking away (M(distractor) = 3.87 sec., SD = 3.29, M(target) = 5.71 sec., 
SD = 3.1, paired t-test, t(27) = 2.35, p < 0.05). This provides additional evidence that 20-month-
old infants treated distractor objects differently than target objects. The difference between the 
duration of the initial look at the retrieved distractor vs. target objects did not emerge for 16-
month-old infants (M(distractor) = 3.39 sec., SD = 2.68, M(target) = 3.58 sec., SD = 2.02, paired 
t-test, t(31) = 0.37, p = 0.71).  
Further analysis of infants’ looking behavior revealed that infants in both age groups 
often looked back at the experimenter to check on her reaction. This occurred on 81.2% of the 
trials in the younger group and on 41% of the trials in the older group, and both, on target and 
distractor trials.  
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Table 2. Exploratory analysis of infants’ behavior. 
 Naming 
object in 
hands 
Mislabeling 
on the 
distractor 
trials 
Rehearsing 
the label 
while 
reaching 
Object 
exploration 
Duration of 
1
st
 look 
Looking 
back at the 
experimenter 
20 
months 
28.6%, 
both T and 
D trials 
62.5% of 
the D trials 
where the 
naming 
occurred (5 
out of 8) 
19.7%, both 
on T and D 
trials 
26.8% of T 
and D trials 
Mean T = 
5.71(3.10) 
41% of T 
and D trials 
Mean D = 
3.87(3.29) 
16 
months 
7.81%, 
mostly on 
T trials 
1.6% (only 
1 instance) 
4.7%, both 
on T and D 
trials 
31.2% of T 
and D trials 
Mean T = 
3.58(2.02) 
81.2% of T 
and D trials 
Mean D = 
3.39(2.68) 
As shown above, younger infants in this experiment did not reach back on distractor trials 
more than on target trials. This suggests that they detected the similarity of the distractor objects 
to the category of objects denoted by the experimenter’s reference, and this made it difficult for 
them to reject the distractors and attempt to find another object inside. Older infants in this 
experiment showed the same pattern of responses as in Experiment 1: they reached back for 
another object more often on distractor trials than on target trials. We assume that older infants 
are more advanced than younger infants in their category knowledge and word comprehension. 
In other words, they should be better able to understand that socks and shoes are related, as well 
as apples and bananas, and at the same time they should be more likely to understand that the 
word “shoe” does not refer to a sock, and the word “banana” should not be used to refer to 
apples. Therefore, it’s unlikely that 20-month-old infants reached back on distractor trials more 
than on target trials in this experiment because they did not detect that the distractors were 
categorically close to the targets. A more likely explanation is that they detected this, but were 
still able to reject categorically related objects as incorrect ones. 
A potential alternative explanation for the finding that infants in the younger group did 
not reach back on distractor trials as often as in Experiment 1 is that they might not have been 
tested with labels they knew as well as those in Experiment 1. The comparison of the words used 
to refer to absent objects in Experiments 1 and 2 with the 16-month-old group showed that the 
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most frequent words in the first experiment were banana, shoe and dog, and in the second 
experiment they were shoe, banana and apple (see Appendix A). The fact that the word sets are 
highly comparable makes it less likely that infants did not reach back on distractor trials as often 
as in Experiment 1 due to their insufficient word knowledge. Additionally, if infants in 
Experiment 2 did not know the words they were tested with we would expect them to reach on 
target trials more often. This did not happen, and the rates of reaching back on target trials were 
the same in both Experiments – 25%. Therefore, 16-month-old infants in Experiment 2 did not 
reach back on distractor trials as often as in Experiment 1 likely because of their difficulty 
rejecting categorically related objects. 
Altogether, Experiment 2 shows that 20-month-old infants’ knowledge of category labels 
is robust enough for them to tell the difference between apples and bananas, shoes and socks, 
cups and bottles, and diapers and pants. At the same time, 16-month-olds appear to have fuzzy 
category boundaries as they have more difficulty rejecting related objects. 
In the next experiment we investigate 20-month-old infants’ ability to reject perceptually 
similar distractors. For this purpose we tested infants with distractor that matched typical 
referents of the mentioned categories on both, color and shape. 
 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen 20-month-old infants participated (range 18 months 26 days – 20 months 25 
days; mean 20 months), 8 girls). Participants were recruited as in Experiment 1. 
Materials and design 
In previous experiments stimuli were chosen such that both target and distractor objects 
were familiar to infants and infants knew their labels. Following this strategy, it was possible to 
find perceptual matches to only 2 objects in the previously used set – the red plastic apple and 
the banana. The match for the red apple was a red plastic ball (both red and round), and the 
match for the banana were two tall yellow blocks put together (both long and yellow) (see 
pictures in Appendix B).  Parents were asked if their infants knew the words “apple”, “banana”, 
“ball” and “blocks”. All but one child knew the first 3 words and not all knew the word “blocks”. 
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Therefore, in the pair “banana – blocks” banana was always the target except for one child who 
did not know the word “banana”, but knew the word “blocks.” 
Procedure, design and coding were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Results and discussion 
1. Reaching back for another object 
The purpose of this experiment was to test infants’ ability to reject perceptually similar 
distractors. We predicted that if infants know what typical tokens of a target category look like 
they may have difficulty rejecting distractor objects that match in color and shape. The results 
supported this prediction (see Figure 3). There were no significant differences in infants’ rates of 
searching back on target and distractor trials. Infants in this experiment reached back on 37.5% 
of target trials, and on 31.25% of distractor trials (McNemar Change test, χ2(1) = 0.07, p = 0.79). 
There were no sex or order effects.  
                                          
Figure 3. Proportion of trials infants reached back into the box to find another object. 
These results may indicate that infants bring to mind some perceptual features associated 
with mentioned categories and thus perceptually similar distractors appear very misleading to 
them. One potential alternative explanation is that these results were observed because of the 
limits we had to place on the stimuli set and because we could not be sure that infants were 
tested with the words they knew best. To investigate this idea we analyzed whether infants’ rates 
of searching back on target trials varied by experiment.  
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If infants reach back on target trials in Experiment 3 more than in 2 other experiments 
that would indicate that they might not be able to recognize typical referents of the mentioned 
category labels used in this experiment. A GEE analysis revealed that experiment was not a 
significant predictor of infants’ reaching back into the box on target trials (χ2(2) = 4.72, p = 
0.094). Infants did not reach back on target trials in Experiment 3 more than in Experiment 2 (b1 
= 0.4, χ2(1) = 2.53, p = 0.61). However, infants’ rate of reaching back on target trials in 
Experiment 3 was marginally higher than in Experiment 1 (b2 = 1.4, χ
2
(1) = 3.63, p = 0.06). This 
suggests that word knowledge could have potentially constrained performance in this 
experiment. 
Additionally, we compared the most frequently used words in Experiments 1-3 (see 
Appendix A) and performed an item analysis in Experiment 3. The 3 words most often 
announced by the researcher in Experiment 1 with 20-month-olds were spoon, apple and shoe. In 
Experiment 2 they were shoe, apple and banana. In Experiment 3, the words announced by the 
researcher were banana, apple and ball. The word apple is used in all 3 experiments. If infants’ 
word knowledge constrains their performance in Experiment 3 we should see that infants 
performed better on trials where the word “apple” was used as a reference, but not with other 
words. We found that infants in Experiment 3 reached back on distractor trials while not 
reaching back on the matched target trails 3 times with the word “banana”, 3 times with the word 
“ball” and 1 time with the word “apple”. This may indicate that infants’ lack of label 
comprehension cannot completely explain experiment 3 findings. At the same time, it cannot be 
completely ruled out because parents were not given the complete questionnaire with 12 words 
like in experiment which would allow us to know if the words banana, apple and ball were 
among best known words for each participant. Therefore, although we favor the explanation that 
perceptual similarity of distractor objects made it difficult for infants to detect a mismatch and 
attempt to find another object on distractor trials, there is still a potential explanation that these 
results were obtained because we had to constrain the stimuli set and could not test each child 
with the best known words.  
2. Exploratory analysis of infants’ behavior 
Like in the previous two experiments we coded infants object label production, object 
exploration patterns and looking behavior (94% of the trials). See summary in Table 3. 
1) Verbal behavior (object label production) 
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 As in previous 2 experiments, infants often named the objects while exploring them. This 
was observed on 31.7% of the trials, both target and distractor trials (compared to 45% in 
Experiment 1 and 28.6% in Experiment 2). On distractor trials infants sometimes mislabeled the 
objects, and it did not occur more often than in previous 2 Experiments: 37.5% (3 out of 8 
instances) of distractor trials where naming occurred in this Experiment compared to 43.8% in 
Experiment 1 and to 65.7% in Experiment 2). Rehearsing the label while reaching did not occur 
very often in this experiment: there were only 3 instances of such behavior. The fact that infants’ 
verbal behavior was very similar to that in Experiments 1 and 2 suggests that, as a group, infants 
were familiar with the words they were tested with. 
2) Object exploration 
 Infants in this experiment often performed actions appropriate for the retrieved objects: 
taking the blocks apart, bouncing the ball against the table, trying to bite the apple and the 
banana. Such actions occurred on 58.3% of the trials, both, target and distractor trials (compared 
to 37% in Experiment 1 and to 26.8% in Experiment 2). Interestingly, there were 6 instances 
when the actions infants performed on the retrieved objects were inappropriate and reflected 
their confusion about what the object was: trying to bounce the apple on the table and trying to 
bite the ball or the blocks. Four of such instances occurred on distractor trials and 2 occurred on 
target trials that came after the distractor trials. Infants’ production of category-specific actions 
suggests that they often, but not always, recognized the object’s category membership. Several 
instances of producing “wrong” actions suggests that perceptual similarity of distractor objects 
may indeed be misleading and confusing for infants. 
3) Looking behavior 
The analysis of the duration of infants’ initial look at the retrieved objects revealed no 
significant differences between target and distractor trials (M(target) = 4.14 sec., SD = 2.55, 
M(distractor) =  4.91 sec., SD = 3.64, paired t-test, t(27) = 94, p = 0.35). However, infants in this 
experiment, like in Experiments 1 and 2, often looked back at the experimenter right after 
looking at the object. This behavior was observed on 76.7% of the trials and it indicates that 
infants were sensitive to the social aspect of the interaction. Looking back at the experimenter 
was observed more often in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 1 (57%) and Experiment 2 (41%) 
most likely because in Experiments 1 and 2 infants reached back in the box more often than in 
Experiment 3. They often did it before checking on the experimenter’s reaction.  
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Table 3. Exploratory analysis of infants’ behavior. 
 Naming 
object in 
hands 
Mislabeling 
on the 
distractor 
trials 
Rehearsing 
the label 
while 
reaching 
Object 
exploration 
Duration 
of 1
st
 look 
Looking 
back at the 
experimenter 
20 months 31.7%, 
both T 
and D 
trials 
37.5% of the 
D trials where 
the naming 
occurred (4 
out of 8 
instances) 
4.7%, 2 
instances 
on T trials 
58.3% of T 
and D 
trials; +6 
instances 
of wrong 
actions 
Mean T = 
4.14(2.55) 
76.7% of T 
and D trials 
Mean D = 
4.91(3.64) 
Altogether, the coding of infants’ verbal behavior suggests that many of them were tested 
with the words that were familiar to them, and that infants were often able to recognize category-
membership of the retrieved objects, but sometimes they may have been confused about it 
because of the object’s appearance. 
Duration of trials in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. 
As shown above, in Experiment 1 in both age groups, and in Experiment 2 in the 20-
month-old group infants searched again in the box after having found an object on distractor 
trials significantly more than on target trials. The analysis of the duration of trials revealed that 
distractor trials were longer than target trials in Experiment 1 in both age groups and in 
Experiment 2 in the 20-month-old group (see Table 4 for summary): Experiment 1, 20-month-
olds, paired t-test, t(30) = 2.28, p < 0.01; 16-month-olds, paired t-test, t(29) = 2.17, p < 0.05; 
Experiment 2, 20-month-olds, paired t-test, t(30) = 1.84, p = 0.08. No significant differences 
were revealed in Experiment 2 for 16-month-olds (paired t-test, t(31) = 0.55, p = 0.59), and in 
Experiment 3 for 20-month-olds (paired t-test, t(27) = 0.81, p = 0.42).  
Table 4. Duration of target and distractor trials by age group and Experiment. 
  Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
20 months 
Target 18.5(6.69)* 16.1 (7.96)* 18.9 (7.12) 
Distractor 24.4(9.53)* 18.9 (8.85)* 20.2 (9.15) 
16 months 
Target 20.4 (8.05)* 18.5 (8.55)  
Distractor 23.2 (9.97)* 19.5 (8.38)  
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To ensure that the difference in the durations of distractor and target trials in Experiments 
1 and 2 (20-month-olds) was not because the experimenter waited longer on distractor trials for 
infants to reach back than on target trials, but because infants were reaching back on distractor 
trials and this took extra time we conducted the following coding. For the distractor trials on 
which infants reached back to find another object we measured the duration of time from the 
onset of the trial to the moment infants started reaching back. We compared this to the duration 
of the corresponding target trials in the same trial blocks. We found that the duration of target 
trials was significantly longer than the latency of reaching back on the distractor trials: 
Experiment 1, 20-month-olds, M(target) = 18.5 sec., SD = 6.69, M(reaching back) = 12.7 sec., 
SD = 6.29, paired t-test, t(16) = 2.59, p < 0.05; 16-month-olds, M(target) = 20.4 sec., SD = 8.05, 
M(reaching back) = 14.1, SD = 7.41, paired t-test, t(15) = 2.26, p < 0.05; Experiment 2, 20-
month-olds, M(target) = 16.1 sec., SD = 7.96, M(reaching back) = 9.25 sec., SD = 4.13, paired t-
test, t(21) = 3.39, p < 0.01).  This demonstrates that infants had enough time on target trials to 
initiate reaching back.  
To summarize, distractor trails lasted longer than target trials not because the 
experimenter terminated the target trials before infants could reach back, but rather because 
infants were reaching back for another object on distractor trials more often than on target trials, 
and this took extra time. 
 
General Discussion 
 The purpose of the current research was to investigate infants’ use of category labels in 
understanding references to absent objects. Sixteen- and 20-month-old infants first heard a 
reference to an object hidden in the box, and then they were allowed to reach in and retrieve it. 
On target trials they retrieved an object that matched the experimenter’s reference, and on 
distractor trials they retrieved a different object – not what was promised by the researcher. 
Infants’ ability to recognize a mismatch on distractor trials and reach back to find another object, 
while accepting target objects as correct referents, demonstrates their comprehension of words as 
category labels. In Experiment 1, when distractor objects were both categorically and 
perceptually unrelated to targets 16- and 20-month-old infants reached back into the box on 
distractor trials more often than on target trials. In Experiment 2, when distractor objects were 
from the same superordinate category as the targets, but looked different, 20-month-olds, but not 
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16-month-old infants, searched again for another object on distractor trials more than on target 
trials. In Experiment 3, when the distractor objects were categorically unrelated, but were 
perceptually similar (matching the targets in shape and color) 20-month-old infants did not show 
a clear pattern of reaching back on distractor trials more often than on target trials. 
 The Experiment 1 findings suggest that infants at both ages were able to recognize novel 
tokens of familiar categories as the correct referents and to reject unrelated distractor objects. 
Thus, infants’ absent reference comprehension does not seem to be solely based on their ability 
to recall a particular object in its specific location. If it were the case they should not have been 
able to accept target objects as correct referents. Infants also were not satisfied at finding wrong 
objects and searched again in the box. Thus, they are able to understand words as referring to 
particular categories of objects and do not extend them to objects from other unrelated 
categories. Therefore, we conclude that infants of at least 16 months can rely on words as 
category labels to interpret absent reference. 
The Experiment 2 results are consistent with the possibility that infants may activate a 
network of categorically related objects in response to experimenter’s reference. When the 
distractor objects were drawn from the same superordinate category as the target objects, but 
were perceptually dissimilar, 16-month-old infants had difficulty detecting a mismatch between 
the experimenter’s reference and the retrieved object. This can happen only if infants recognize 
that the retrieved object is close in categorical space to a group of objects that are the right 
referents of the mentioned word. Older, 20-month-old infants did not have difficulty rejecting 
categorically related distractors. Most likely this happened because infants at 20 months have 
more precise word knowledge and more clear category boundaries than infants at 16-months, and 
thus they were able to understand that bananas are not apples, and socks are not shoes. Yet 
another possibility is that 20-month-old infants did not recognize that the distractor objects were 
close categorically to typical referents of the announced words and treated them as unrelated 
objects, like in Experiment 1. We do not favor this explanation because it presupposes that older 
infants have less knowledge about categories of objects than younger infants, which is unlikely.  
In Experiment 3, 20-month-old infants had difficulty rejecting perceptually similar, but 
categorically unrelated distractors. This suggests that infants may also retrieve some perceptual 
information in response to hearing a word. They know what typical referents look like, and this 
interferes with their ability to recognize that distractor objects similar in shape and color are 
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incorrect. Such instances of infants’ object exploration behavior as bouncing the apple on the 
table, or trying to bite the blocks provide additional evidence that infants may have been 
confusing the distractor objects with the correct referents because of their appearance.  
The finding that categorically related distractors and perceptually similar distractors are 
more difficult for infants to reject than unrelated distractors is consistent with previous research 
on toddler’s language comprehension. For example, in Arias-Trejo & Plunkett (2010) 21-24-
month-old toddlers’ ability to look at the picture of the mentioned object was impaired when the 
distractor was drawn from the same global category and when it was perceptually similar to the 
target. The authors conclude that “early representations of meaning are linked not only to their 
original referent, but also to related concepts sharing ontological status and/or perceptual 
properties” (Arias-Trejo & Plunkett, 2010, p.78). This conclusion was also reached in priming-
interference studies. For example, in Styles & Plunkett (2009) 24-month-old toddlers’ target 
recognition was more robust after hearing a semantically related word (e.g., cat-dog), than after 
hearing an unrelated word (plate-dog) (see also Arias-Trejo & Plunkett, 2009; Johnson, 
McQueen & Huettig, 2011; Mani et al., in press). In the current research, these findings were 
extended to younger ages (16 and 20 months).  
One question that remains unanswered and can be address in future research is when 
perceptual and conceptual activations take place in the process of absent reference 
comprehension. One possibility is that infants’ search in the box is guided by a reference-elicited 
representation of what the experimenter told them to find. In other words, they bring to mind a 
representation associated with the mentioned category label before finding an object. Another 
possibility is that infants bring such representation to mind only after having found an object in 
the box. It is possible that they initially search in the box without having a clear idea of what is in 
it. Only after having found an object they call to mind a long-term semantic representation 
associated with the experimenter’s reference, and use it to decide if the object in hand matches 
this representation or does not. In case it does not they assume that there must be a different 
object in the box and reach back to find it. Again, infants’ secondary search does not require 
them to represent anything specific.  
This second possibility is in accord with previous research on adults’ and toddlers’ 
language comprehension. For example, in Huettig & Altmann (2010) adult participants were 
presented with a word and a picture that contained unrelated distractors and one color associated 
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distractor (a conceptually unrelated object in the color prototypical to the target concept: e.g., 
green blouse when hearing the word “frog”). Only when the pictures were presented in color 
were the participants more likely to fixate at the color associated distractor than at other 
distractors. When the stimuli were presented in black and white or in line participants were not 
more likely to fixate on color associated distractors (e.g., spinach as a distractor for the word 
“frog”). This suggests that visual effects found in the first case (green blouse) were driven by 
perceived color information (e.g., the perceived surface color of the visual object), not by stored 
conceptual information (e.g., the stored knowledge about the typical color of the target object).  
Similar results were found for 3-year-old children in Johnson & Huettig (2011) and for 2-
year-old children in Johnson, McQueen & Huettig (2011). Children fixate at color matched 
distractor (red plane) after hearing a word (strawberry) more than at unrelated distractors (yellow 
plane). This effect did not hold when the stimuli were presented in line drawings or in black and 
white. As concluded, color is not an intrinsic property of conceptual representations and is only 
retrieved at the stage of visual search. Likely, children know the prototypical color of the 
mentioned concept, but only bring this information to working memory when searching for the 
target among other objects presented in color. 
Exploratory analysis of infants’ behavior on experimental trials in the current research 
revealed several interesting patterns. First, infants often labeled the retrieved objects, 20-month-
olds more often than 16-months-olds. This occurred on both, distractor and target trials, and in 
all 3 experiments. This suggests that infants were indeed familiar with the objects used in this 
study, and that their productive language is more robust at 20 months than at 16. Infants (mostly 
20-month-olds) also occasionally rehearsed the labels provided by the experimenter when 
searching in the box. This cannot be taken as evidence that their search is guided by a specific 
mental representation because they might have been just repeating the words after the 
experimenter without representing anything. However, it does demonstrate that they might have 
a high enough level of phonological memory to hold in mind a previously announced word when 
processing later retrieved objects.  
Rehearsing the words sometimes led infants to mislabel distractor objects. Some of the 
20-month-old infants were able to produce correct labels after having detected a mismatch. This 
further demonstrates infants’ productive vocabulary and word knowledge at this age. 
Additionally, this provides further evidence that their searching for another object on distractor 
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trials was driven by detecting a mismatch between the experimenter’s reference and the retrieved 
object.  
Infants’ detection of a mismatch between objects in hands and the experimenter’s 
reference is also reflected in their looking behavior and mimics. As found in Experiment 1 and 2, 
20-month-old infants’ first look at distractor objects was quicker than their first look at target 
objects. On distractor trials they were able to quickly detect a mismatch, and then they either 
looked back at the experimenter or reached again to find another object. On target trials they 
concentrated on exploring the objects because there was no mismatch.  
The coding of infants’ looking behavior also showed that they were sensitive to the social 
component of the interaction. After having retrieved an object they often looked back at the 
experimenter to check on her reaction. This happened in both age groups and on both distractor 
and target trials. 
Altogether, these findings suggest that infants as young as 16 months can rely on their 
understanding of words as category labels when interpreting absent reference, and their 
understanding is not restricted by remembering a particular recently seen object and its specific 
location. Infants’ language comprehension is social in nature, and they are sensitive to the 
potential of words to refer to any object from a given category. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
INFANTS’ USE OF INTONATION TO INTERPRET AMBIGUOUS REFERENCE 
 
Introduction 
Language provides us with an important means of communicating information to each 
other. However, verbal messages are not a perfect and a direct way of meeting minds. Linguistic 
expressions do not perfectly reflect what the speaker has in mind, and in everyday life we deal 
with a number of ambiguous verbal messages. For example, there can be multiple potential 
objects that a pronoun can refer to or there can be several objects in view that can be named with 
the same noun (e.g., several different cups). Despite this ambiguity, people manage to understand 
each other by relying on different nonverbal information (e.g., linguistic context or their 
knowledge of the speaker) or (if they are able) by simply asking for clarification. 
Previous research has shown that the ability to interpret ambiguous references is available 
to infants in their second year of life. Infants can rely on various types of information to infer 
what exactly the speaker refers to. For example, infants as young as 12 months are able to use the 
direction of the speaker’s voice when the speaker is not visible to infer which of the 2 possible 
referents she is attending to (Rossano, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2012). In this study, 12- and 16-
month-olds watched the experimenter go behind a barrier. While the experimenter was not 
visible to them they heard her verbally express excitement about a toy hidden in one of two 
boxes at either end of the barrier. When infants were allowed to find the toy at both ages they 
went to the box that the experimenter’s voice was directed at. 
Infants as young as 15 and 18 months have been shown to use previous shared linguistic 
context to infer the referent of an ambiguous pronoun “it” (Ganea & Saylor, 2007). In this study, 
infants saw the experimenter searching for an absent toy (puppy) while saying “I really want to 
find my puppy!” and “Is my puppy under here?” Then infants were shown two toys – the target 
(a puppy) and a distractor. When asked “Can you get it for me?” they were able to infer that 
experimenter meant the puppy based on what she had been previously talking about. This did not 
happen because the representation of a “puppy” was still active in infants’ minds at the time of 
the request. When a different experimenter provided an ambiguous request infants selected the 
objects at chance.  
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Southgate, Chevallier & Csibra (2010) demonstrated that 17-month-old infants can also 
track the requester’s epistemic state and use this to infer the referent of an ambiguous request. In 
this study, infants saw the experimenter put two novel objects each in its own box. After the 
experimenter left, an assistant appeared from behind curtains. She switched the objects in boxes 
in the “false belief” condition and did not switch them in the “true belief” condition. Then the 
experimenter came back and pointed at one of the boxes and said: “There’s a sefo in here. 
There’s a sefo in this box. Shall we play with the sefo?” Infants retrieved the object from the 
non-referred box when the experimenter had a false belief about the contents of the box she was 
pointing at. Infants approached the referred box in the true belief condition.  
Finally, infants have been shown to keep track of other people’s experiences with objects 
and use that information to interpret ambiguous verbal references (Liebal, Carpenter & 
Tomasello, 2010; Moll, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2007; Saylor & Ganea, 2007; Tomasello & 
Haberl, 2003). However, in some studies infants consistently select an object that is new to the 
experimenter, while in other studies infants infer that the experimenter wants an old, familiar 
object. For example, in Saylor and Ganea (2007), 14- to 20-month-old infants saw two 
experimenters play separately with a different ball. The balls were then put in opaque containers 
matching the colors of the balls. When one of the experimenters came back and asked for her 
ball using ambiguous request (“Give me the ball!”) infants used to pick up the ball that she 
previously played with. Younger, 12-month-old infants can also select the old object for the 
experimenter if she uses possessive pronoun “my” instead of the definite article “the” when 
talking about her ball (Saylor, Ganea & Vazquez, 2011). In another study 18-month-old infants 
played with two experimenters sequentially using distinct objects (Liebal, Carpenter & 
Tomasello, 2010). Later they saw pictures of the objects in the company of either experimenter 1 
or experimenter 2. They pointed to the pictures of those objects that they used in a shared game 
with the corresponding experimenter.  
In contrast to this, in several other studies infants inferred that the experimenter was 
asking about a new object (e.g., Tomasello & Haberl, 2003; Moll, Carpenter & Tomasello, 
2007). For example, in Tomasello and Haberl (2003) 12- and 18-month-old infants played with 
two experimenters with two toys. A third toy was introduced to them while one of the 
experimenters was absent. At test, while all three toys were on the tray, the experimenter who 
did not see the third toy showed great excitement (“Oh, wow! Look at that! Look at that!”) and 
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asked the infants ambiguously “Give it to me, please!” Infants selected the toy that the 
experimenter had not seen before assuming she wanted the new object. Moll, Carpenter and 
Tomasello (2007) extended these findings showing that infants can make such inferences only 
when all objects are introduced in a joint attention episode and not after observing this from a 
third party perspective.  
The purpose of the current research is to investigate this puzzling discrepancy between 
the studies demonstrating infants’ ability to track peoples’ experiences with objects to 
disambiguate reference. Why did infants select an old object in Saylor & Ganea (2007) and in 
Liebal, Carpenter & Tomasello (2010), and a new object in Tomasello and Haberl (2003) and 
Moll, Carpenter and Tomasello (2007)? One possibility is that infants can rely on the intonation 
of the request to infer whether a person is asking them about an old or a new object. In the 
current study we test if infants’ choice of a new vs. a familiar object depends on the intonation of 
the experimenter’s request (excited vs. neutral). 
There is indication that infants are sensitive to the way adults talk to them and understand 
affective intonation from a very young age. Infants prefer to listen to infant directed speech 
(Fernald, 1989; Pegg et al., 1992). Five-month-old infants react more positively to affirmative 
than prohibitive vocalizations with no lexical content, but only do it when vocalization are 
delivered in infant-directed speech (Fernald, 1993). Brain activity as measured by event-related 
potentials shows enhanced sensory processing of emotional compared to neutral prosody at 7 
months (Grossman, Striano & Friederici, 2005). There is evidence that infants not only recognize 
emotional valence in speech but also understand its meaning: infants as young as 5 to 7 months 
of age are able to match happy, sad, angry, neutral affective intonations with corresponding 
facial expressions (Walker, 1982; Walker-Andrews, 1988). Infants also attend to the visual 
modality of emotions. For example, they consult their mom’s facial expression to decide whether 
to approach a strange toy (Klinnert, 1984) or whether to cross a visual cliff (Sorce et al., 1985).  
Importantly, it has been demonstrated that infants understand excited intonation in a 
special way. Moll et al. (2006) has shown that infants interpret excitement as specifically 
directed at something new. In that study, when infants of 14, 18 and 24 months saw the 
experimenter being excited about an old, familiar object they interpreted this excitement as 
directed to either a part of that object or to something else in the lab, but not to the object itself. 
At the same time, excitement directed to a new object was interpreted as about the object as a 
37 
 
whole. According to this, it is possible that infants in Tomasello and Haberl (2003) and Moll, 
Carpenter and Tomasello (2007) selected the object that was new to the experimenter possibly 
because the request was delivered in a highly excited manner. In comparison, in Saylor & Ganea 
(2007) the request was made in an infant friendly, but neutral way, and infants selected the object 
that was familiar to the experimenter. 
In the current study we investigate infants’ ability to recognize and use emotional 
prosody in reference resolution. For this purpose, we adapt the ambiguous reference task used in 
Saylor and Ganea (2007) so that for one group of infants the request is made in a flat neutral 
way, and for another group it is made in a highly excited manner. As suggested by previous 
research, infants are able to keep track of others’ experiences with objects and to understand 
excitement as directed at something new at about 14 months (Moll et al., 2006; Saylor & Ganea, 
2007). Therefore, we predicted that infants should be able to pick the new ball in the excited 
request condition and pick the old ball in the neutral request condition. We expected 20-month-
old infants to do it more robustly than 16-month-old infants because their working memory, 
language and intonation understanding is more robust than that of 16-month-olds.  
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 56 healthy full-term infants with normal hearing and from English-
speaking families. Twenty-four were 16 months old (range 14 months 19 days – 17 months 20 
days, mean 16 months 1 day; 14 girls) and 32 were 20 months old (range 19 months 1 day – 21 
months 18 days; mean 20 months 4 days; 12 girls). Ten additional 20-month-old infants 
participated, but were omitted: 2 for being unresponsive (did not approach any ball), 5 for 
grabbing both balls at the same time, 3 for approaching the balls when they were not supposed 
to. One 16-month-old infant participated but was omitted due to experimenter error. Participants 
were primarily Caucasian and from middle class families. They were recruited from the Greater 
Nashville area by phone from a database of interested families. 
Materials 
During experimental sessions infants played with a red and a blue ball. Two sandbox 
buckets of matching colors were used to store the balls. Two cameras were used to videotape the 
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sessions: one camera recorded infants from the front to code their behavior and the other camera 
positioned at the corner of the room recorded the experimenter from the front and infants from 
the back side. 
Design 
Infants in each of the age groups were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions. In the excited request condition the request for the ball was made in a highly excited 
manner. In the neutral request condition the request was made in a neutral manner. To make the 
experimental manipulation stronger the difference between the excited and the neutral intonation 
was exaggerated: the neutral tone was more neutral than in Saylor and Ganea (2007), and the 
excited intonation was clearly very excited.   
Procedure 
Infants were tested in a rectangular room with two 1 m. high cabinets positioned along 
the short wall to the left of the entrance. The front camera was placed in between the cabinets. 
Parents were positioned at the center of the opposite wall facing the front camera. The rear 
camera was placed in the corner of the room to the right of participants. Infants were free to 
move around the room. Room set-up is schematically represented in Appendix C. 
During the experimental sessions infants played with two experimenters that were 
physically distinct from each other. The requester role was randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimenters.  
Experimental sessions consisted of two parts – ball introduction and test. The purpose of 
the ball introduction phase was to give infants experience with each of the two experimenters 
and their balls. The purpose of the test phase was to assess whether infants reverse their 
interpretation of the ambiguous reference based on the intonation with which the request is 
delivered. 
Ball introduction 
At the beginning of the ball introduction phase the buckets were placed on file cabinets, 
one on the right cabinet and one on the left. Infants will see each of the experimenters play with 
one of the balls and label the ball several times. The first experimenter took her ball out of its 
bucket (e.g., the blue ball from the blue bucket) and said: “Look! Here is the ball!” She played 
with the infant for one minute. During the play she could bounce the ball, roll it, throw it, hid it 
under the bucket or perform other actions according to infants’ interests. She mentioned the ball 
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8-10 times (e.g., “We are playing with the ball!, “Can you give me the ball?”). She could also 
make general comments on the situation or infants’ actions (e.g., “Are you having fun?”, “Are 
you going back to mommy?”). During this phase the experimenter talked in an infant directed 
speech like she normally would talk to a child, and avoided being either too neutral or too 
excited. At the end of the ball introduction phase the experimenter put her ball in the bucket 
saying “My ball goes here” and put the bucket with the ball inside on the cabinet. She then 
walked out of the door while the second experimenter came in. They met at the door to ensure 
infants understood that there were 2 different people. The other experimenter repeated the entire 
sequence with the other ball and at the end of this phase put the ball with the bucket in their 
initial position on the cabinet.  
Test phase 
At the beginning of the test phase the experimenters came in one at a time, took the 
bucket with their ball and put it on the floor in front of the infant in the same spatial position as 
they had been on the cabinets. For example, if the blue bucket was on the left cabinet and the red 
bucket on the right one they remained on the floor in the same configuration – the blue bucket to 
the left of the red one. The buckets were initially put 1.22 m. apart. The parents were instructed 
to hold on to their infants to prevent them getting the balls at this time.  
Following this, one of the experimenters came back, sat between the buckets, took them 
both at the same time and brought them close together without looking inside. Then she looked 
inside both buckets at the same time, raised her eyes on the infant again and said: “Look at that! 
Do you see it? I see it! Can you give it to me?” In the excited request condition the experimenter 
said these phrases in a very excited manner, stressing the words “look” and “that”, using high 
pitch, loud voice, and making sharp pitch changes. She also brought her palms together at the 
beginning of the request to make sure infants notice her excitement. In the neutral request 
condition the experimenter used a neutral falling intonation saying “Look at that” and “I see it”, 
and neutral interrogative intonation saying phrases “Do you see it?” and “Can you give it to 
me?” In both conditions, while saying “Can you give it to me?” the experimenter moved the 
buckets forward to the baby and slightly apart to make it easier to tell which bucket infants 
attend to. At this time the experimenter gave parents a hint to release the infant and continued 
looking straight until the infant made her choice to avoid biasing infants’ responses with a head 
movement. Once infants made their selection, the experimenter clapped and said “thank you.” If 
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a baby would not make the selection in 10 seconds after the request the experimenter repeated 
the request: “Do you see it? I see it! Can you give it to me?” – using the same intonation as 
before. Which ball served as the target, the side it appeared on and whether E1 or E2 is the 
requester were counterbalanced across participants. 
Coding 
Infants’ responses were coded depending on whether they select the ball that the 
requester previously played with (old) or the other ball (new). If infants did not approach and 
take the ball out of the bucket their first look or point at one of the buckets were considered. If an 
infant first approached one ball, but did not pick, and then went and picked the other one, the ball 
that they picked was considered as their choice. Initial judgments were made during the session 
by the requesting experimenter. Videotapes (78.6%) were then coded by a naïve coder. Overall 
agreement between the experimenter and the coder was 95.5%. Disagreement occurred in two 
cases in the neutral request condition with 20-month-old infants who did not walk to pick a ball, 
but only looked at one or the other. Disagreements were resolved by discussion which resulted in 
the coding identical to the experimenter’s initial one. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The purpose of the experiment was to test if infants at 16 and 20 months are able to take 
into account the speaker’s intonation of the request when settling down on the right referent of an 
ambiguous request. We predicted that infants would reverse their selection of new vs. old 
referents depending on whether the request is made in the excited or a neutral way, and 20-
month-old infants to so more consistently that 16-month-olds. The results supported our 
predictions (see Figure 4). 
The analysis of infants’ selection of the old vs. the new balls in the excited and the 
neutral request conditions indicated that for older infants the choice of the ball was overall 
influenced by the intonation of the request (χ2(1) = 4.99, p < 0.05). Fourteen out of 16 kids 
selected the ball that was new to the experimenter (one infant looked and all other approached 
and picked) and only 2 picked the old ball (Binomial test, p < 0.01).  In contrast, in the in the 
neutral request condition infants did not select the old ball at above chance levels as predicted: 9 
out 16 infants selected the old ball (Binomial test, p = 0.8). This means that infants successfully 
picked the right ball only in the excited request condition. Sixteen-month-olds did not reliably 
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use intonation to determine which ball to choose: in the excited and the neutral request 
conditions 6 infants selected the new ball and 6 selected the old ball, which is not different from 
chance level (Binomial tests, p’s = 1). 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of infants selecting new vs. old balls. 
To ensure that infants’ behavior was not biased by the experimenters’ behaviors we 
conducted several additional analyses. First, to check that the requesting and the non-requesting 
experimenter were playing with infants in a similar way an independent coder analyzed 68.8% of 
the rear camera recordings of the play phase (all from the older group of participants) and 
guessed which of the 2 experimenters was going to perform the request. She could correctly 
guess on 50% of the trials, which is not different from chance (Binomial test, p = 1). This 
suggests that there were no systematic differences in the experimenters’ behavior. Additionally, 
we calculated the number of times the requesting and the non-requesting experimenters used the 
word “ball” in the play phase in both age groups (94% of the tapes coded for 20-month-olds in 
the excited condition, 87.5% for 20-month-olds in the neutral condition, 91.7% for 16-month-
olds in the excited condition, and 67% for 16-month-olds in the neutral condition). There were 
no systematic differences in the older group of infants: excited request, M (requesting exp.) = 
8.06, SD = 1.44; M (non-requesting) = 8.20, SD = 1.70, t(27.26) = 0.23, p = 0.82; neutral 
request, M (requesting exp.) = 8.14, SD = 1.56; M (non-requesting) = 9.36, SD = 2.81, t(20.3) = 
1.41, p = 0.17. No systematic differences were found in the younger group excited request 
condition: M (requesting exp.) = 9.36, SD = 1.43; M (non-requesting) = 10.54, SD = 2.01, 
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t(18.04) = 1.58, p = 0.13. However, in the neutral request condition the non-requesting 
experimenter tended to use the word “ball” more often than the requesting experimenter: M 
(requesting exp.) = 10.36, SD = 1.19; M (non-requesting) = 14.63, SD = 5.29, t(7.7) = 2.22, p = 
0.06. However, this did not affect infants’ responses, as they chose the new and the old balls at 
chance levels. Finally, to test if cuing during the test phase occurred, the same coder analyzed 
81% of rear camera recordings of the test phase (all from the older group of participants) and 
guessed which ball was the target. She could correctly identify the right ball on 42% of the trials 
which is not different from chance (Binomial test, p = 0.6). Thus, the requesting experimenter 
did not cue infants at the test phase.  
Altogether, our results suggest that infants at 20 months, but not at 16 months, can rely 
on the intonation of the request to interpret ambiguous reference. Older infants were consistently 
selecting the new ball for the requester in the excited request condition, however, did not show 
this clear pattern in the neutral condition. This is consistent with the findings reported in previous 
research by Tomasello and his colleagues showing that infants understand excitement as directed 
at new objects (Tomasello & Haberl, 2003). Sixteen-month-old infants did not demonstrate such 
understanding most likely because of the cognitive load imposed by our procedure: there were 2 
people coming in and out, and 2 very similar objects to choose from.  
Additionally, we did not replicate the Saylor and Ganea (2007) results in the neutral 
condition where infants were expected to pick the old ball. This could be due to one of the two 
changes we’ve made to the Saylor and Ganea (2007) procedure. We changed the request from 
“Where is the ball? Can you give it to me?” which is more clearly about the old ball, to “Look at 
that! Can you give it to me?” which is much less clearly about the old ball even if pronounced 
without any excitement. Second, the buckets were brought together at the beginning of the test 
phase to allow the experimenter to look inside both of them simultaneously. This weakens the 
spatial cue that is reported to be highly important for infants in Saylor and Ganea (2007). They 
found that keeping the buckets in their original locations is crucial for infants’ ability to identify 
the target ball. Despite infants’ poor performance in our neutral request condition, the 
comparison between conditions suggests that infants at this age use intonation to disambiguate 
references. 
In this experiment, both experimenters introduced their balls to infants in the play phase 
in an infant friendly, but neutral way. None of them was excited or showed any emotions to their 
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ball in the play phase. When infants saw one of the experimenters excited about something in the 
test phase they interpreted the request as about the new ball. In Experiment 2 we ask if infants 
can take into account a person’s prior interaction with an object to interpret excitement as about 
something old. In Experiment 2 infants saw an experimenter being very excited about an object. 
At test, the experimenter saw a new object and another very similar to the familiar object she 
used to be excited about before and asked infants for one in an excited way. We were interested 
to see if infants could infer that the experimenter may have been asking for the familiar object 
again. 
 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty full-term, healthy 20-month-old infants with normal hearing and from English-
speaking families participated (M = 20 months 8 days, range 19 months 8 days – 21 months 9 
days, 12 girls). 
Materials 
Four objects were used for this experiment. Two were toy cars identical in shape, but of 
different colors (one yellow, one red), and 2 sets of toy keys that were of slightly different color 
and shape, but of a similar size (see pictures in Appendix B). The objects were selected such that 
they were equally interesting for infants and were familiar to them. Label knowledge for these 
objects was not required as the objects were never mentioned by names during the experiment.  
A 25 X 50 cm tray was used to play with the objects during the object introduction phase 
and during the test phase to present the objects in front of the infant. The experiment was 
videotaped from the front and the back to enable coding the experimenter’s behavior and the 
infant’s behavior. 
Procedure 
During the experiment infants sat on the parent’s lap across the table from the 
experimenter and the assistant. The experimenter and the assistant sat next to each other. The 
table was oriented such that the door was behind the experimenter. Parents were instructed not to 
name any objects and not to encourage infants in any way.  
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Object introduction phase 
1. Experimenter’s play 
During the object introduction phase, once every one was seated the experimenter looked 
at the infant and said: “Let’s see what <assistant’s name”> has for us! Then the assistant took an 
object from under the table where neither the experimenter, nor the infant could have seen it and 
gave it to the experimenter. The object could be either one of the 2 cars or one of the 2 sets of 
keys. The experimenter took the object and exclaimed: “Wow! Look at that! What a great toy! I 
like it a lot!” The objects were referred to as either “a toy”, “it”, “this one” or “this thing”. The 
experimenter first played with the object herself showing to the infant that she was excited about 
this toy. She performed a variety of actions like rolling or hiding the car under the tray, spinning 
the keys around the ring, sliding them down the tray of hiding them under it. The experimenter 
mentioned the actions she was performing: “We can roll it/hide it/spin it”, etc., and said general 
phrases like: “Is this fun?” After having manipulated the object she gave it to the infant asking: 
“Do you want to play with it?” The infant and the experimenter then played with the object 
together for a minute. At the end of the object introduction phase the assistant took the object 
and put it away. The experimenter then said “OK, <the assistant’s name> took it away! Nothing 
else to do… Boring…” Then she stood up and said “I need to go now! I will be back to play with 
you soon!” She went into the adjacent room and closed the door. She was able to watch what 
was going on in the experimental room through a semi-transparent window (the experimenter 
was not visible to the infant, but the experimenter saw the infant). Whether a car or a set of keys, 
and which of the two in each pair was used in this phase was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
The experimenter showed great excitement about the toy throughout the whole 
experimenter’s play and demonstrated that she likes this object. The play phase was later coded 
by an independent coder who was asked to rate how excited the experimenter was during the 
play phase on a 4-point scale: 1 for neutral, 2 for cheerful, 3 for excited, 4 for really excited. The 
experimenter’s excitement received the highest rating (4) 100% of the time. 
2. Assistant’s play 
The purpose of the assistant’s play was to introduce both test objects to the infant to keep 
infants from selecting the new object for the experimenter because of their own novelty 
reference. Once the experimenter was gone, the assistant took 2 more objects out and played 
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with the infant with these objects until the infant got familiar with both of them (about a minute). 
One of the objects was from a different category than the object used during the experimenter’s 
play. The other object was similar to the one that the experimenter played with before leaving. 
For example, if the experimenter played with a toy car in the experimenter’s play, in the 
assistant’s play the assistant showed the infant the other car and a set of keys. The reason for 
using an object similar to the one used in the experimenter’s play and not the same one was to 
keep the relative novelty of the 2 test objects comparable for the infants. The assistant played 
with the 2 objects in a neutral way and encouraged the infant to play with both objects rather 
than with only one of them. At the end of the assistant’s play phase she took the objects from the 
infant and put them under the table on her lap. The tray stayed on the table.  
Test phase 
Once the objects were put away, the experimenter entered the room again and stopped 
behind her chair facing the infant. At this time the assistant put the 2 objects used in the 
assistant’s play on the opposite sides of the tray. She kept the tray close to herself out of the 
infant’s reach. The experimenter looked at the table in between the 2 objects (to avoid cueing 
infants) and exclaimed in an excited way: “<Infant’ name>! Look at that! Do you see it? Can you 
give it to me?” While saying the last phrase she reached out with her hand for the infant to give 
her one object. If the infant did not pick any objects, she repeated the request. If the infant gave 
her both objects she asked: “Can you give me one?” The right/left position of the new and 
familiar objects on the tray was counterbalanced.  
Coding 
We coded if infants picked the new or the familiar object for the experimenter in the test 
phase. If they first touched one and then picked the other, their second choice was coded. If they 
just touched one object or looked at it, but did not pick any of the objects, we coded their first 
touch or look. Infants’ responses were first recorded after the study by the experimenter. A coder 
naïve to the study hypothesis analyzed the test phase of the experiment and recorded which of 
the objects the infant picked. The coder and the experimenter agreed on the chosen object for 
100% of the participants. 
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Results and Discussion 
The purpose of this experiment was to test if infants can take into account the speaker’s 
previous interactions with the object to interpret excitement as directed at something familiar. 
We expected that if infants watch the experimenter being excited about an object, when the 
experimenter sees a similar object and a new object, infants would be likely to pick an object 
similar to the one that she liked (we call it “familiar”), rather than a new object. The results did 
not confirm our predictions: 15 of them picked the new object, which is higher than chance 
(Binomial test, p < 0.05), and 5 infants picked the old object (see Figure 5). Most of the infants 
picked one of the objects. Three infants looked at one of the objects, but did not pick any, and 2 
touched an object, but did not pick. There were no gender, object side or object type effects. 
 
Figure 5. Proportion of infants selecting new vs. old object. 
The findings from this experiment suggest that at 20 months, infants do not reliably take 
into consideration the nature of the speaker’s previous interactions with an object to interpret 
excitement as referring to a familiar object. If a speaker displays excitement at an object, when a 
similar object and a different object are present in front of her, infants still pick the object that is 
new to the speaker.   
 
General Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate infants’ ability to use intonation of the 
request to interpret ambiguous reference. In Experiment 1, 20-month-old infants’ selection of 
familiar vs. new objects was influenced by the intonation of the request. When asked 
ambiguously in an excited way “Look at that! Can you give it to me?” infants reliably chose the 
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object that was new to the experimenter. When asked in a neutral way infants were not sure 
which of the two possible referents the researcher meant. Younger, 16-month-old infants did not 
reliably use the speaker’s intonation to guess which of the 2 objects she was asking about.  
In Experiment 2, 20-month-old infants interpreted the speaker’s excited request as about 
a new object and disregarded the fact that she previously used be very excited about the familiar 
object. Thus, at 20 months, infants very robustly interpret excitement as directed at something 
new, and this understanding does not change as a function of a person’s previous interactions 
with a familiar object. This shows that infants’ resolution of ambiguous references is quite 
limited by their own understanding of what’s interesting and by some heuristics developed 
across observations of typical human behavior and preferences. Another possibility though is 
that exposure to only one object during the experimenter’s play was not enough for infants to 
understand that the experimenter likes the whole category of such things. It could be that during 
the test phase it was too difficult for them to generalize the experimenter’s preference to another 
token of the given category and infer that she was asking about that kind of stuff again rather 
than about a new object.  
An important question frequently asked about the knowledge infants demonstrate is at 
what level they pass the experimental tasks. They can rely on low-level attentional and memory 
processes or on higher level social and conceptual knowledge. Infants’ ability to track other’ 
experiences and goals to interpret ambiguous requests for objects can be supported by two 
different processes. According to Tomasello and his colleagues, young infants are capable of 
understanding others as intentional agents and interpret others’ behavior in terms of mental states 
and desires (Tomasello, 2000; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). When interpreting ambiguous 
requests for object infants may reason about the speaker’s communicative intent to refer to one 
of several objects, and engage in perspective-taking to decide which one she wants. However, it 
is also possible that infants interpret ambiguous requests based on low level attentional and 
associationistic processes. For example, they can choose the ball that the experimenter 
previously played with because the experimenter’s presence activates the representation of one 
of the balls, and this representation is stronger at the time of the request than the representation 
of the other ball. At the same time, in Tomasello & Haberl, 2003; Moll, Carpenter & Tomasello, 
2007) infants may have been choosing the object that was new to the requester because this 
object was treated differently comparing to other objects on the tray (Samuelson & Smith, 1998). 
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It was introduced in a special context: one of the experimenters left the room before it was 
shown to the infants.  
Reasoning at a higher level of others’ mental states and desires presupposes that infants 
consider all possible referents and think about the speaker’s intention to refer to one of them. In 
the current study 20-month-old infants’ selection of the new ball in the excited request condition 
is difficult to explain by low-level attentional and associationistic processes. If they acted based 
on the existing association between the requesting experimenter and one of the balls they would 
have selected the old ball in both conditions. Almost all infants selected the new ball in the 
excited condition which suggests that they must have considered both potential referents and 
took into account the speaker’s desire to play with a particular one – the one that she had not yet 
explored. At the same time, younger infants’ failure to reliably pick the new ball in the excited 
condition does not have to be due to their inability to consider all possible referents and rely on 
the speaker’s communicative intent to pick one. It could be due to the overall cognitive load of 
the procedure which made it difficult for them to pass the task.  
Overall, this research shows that between 16 and 20 months there is a significant 
improvement in infants’ ability to interpret ambiguous reference. At 20 months, infants are able 
to consider multiple objects as potential referents and to rely on the intonation of the request to 
infer which one the speaker has in mind. By doing so, infants display their sensitivity to the 
social component of linguistic interaction, their ability to take the perspective of the speaker and 
to infer her intention behind the words.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of the current two studies was to investigate infants’ access to and their use 
of two sources of information when establishing common ground with the speaker. In study 1, I 
investigated infants’ access to shared linguistic evidence through understanding words as 
category labels. In study 2, I investigated infants’ access to shared perceptual evidence and their 
ability to use speaker’s intonation during a request to identify referents.  
The findings from Study 1 suggest that infants as young as 16-months understand words 
as category labels. When presented with a reference to an absent object infants had an 
expectation to see one of many possible objects from the mentioned category rather than one 
particular object they initially learned the name for. On target trials, infants accepted objects as 
the correct referents although they had never seen those objects before, and such objects were not 
the ones that infants initially learned the names for. Such behavior must have been based on 
infants’ long-term knowledge of how typical referents of the mentioned words look like and 
based on their understanding that object names most often function as category labels. This 
suggests that infants’ understanding of absent reference does not require bringing to mind a 
particular recently seen object in its specific location. At 16-20 months infants’ understanding is 
rather general and they can consider a group of similar objects belonging to the mentioned 
category as a set of potential referents. 
At the same time, in this study infants did not accept unrelated objects as the correct 
referents on distractor trials. In both age groups infants assumed there must have been a different 
object inside and reached back into the box in an attempt to find one. Infants could have done 
this only if they recognized the mismatch between the object found in the box and what the 
experimenter asked them to find. This suggests that infants’ memory for the label was strong 
enough for them to remember the experimenter’s reference while reaching for an object in the 
box and still hold it in mind while exploring the retrieved object. Infants’ inference that there 
must have been a different object in the box and their attempt to find one also suggests that they 
understand the intentional component of a linguistic reference. Likely, they interpreted the 
experimenter’s reference as an invitation to join attention on an object from the specified 
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category, and not on any kind of object. This also suggests that infants’ knowledge of words is 
precise enough for them to recognize that distractor objects do not belong to the set of objects 
that are from the mentioned category. 
Study 1 findings suggest that infants may also be able to recognize that some objects are 
categorically closer to each other than other objects. Younger, 16-month-old infants, had 
difficulty rejecting distractor objects that were from the same superordinate category as the 
mentioned targets. For example, when asked find a shoe (banana, bottle, etc.) they did not reach 
back for another object after having found a related object like a sock (apple, cup, etc.) Infants at 
this age may not have clear category boundaries and may overgeneralize certain common nouns 
to tokens of proximal categories. However, this effect may be limited to situations when 
referents are absent. Infants may be well able to tell the difference between categorically related 
objects like cups and bottles, shoes and socks, apples and bananas in referent-present situations, 
because in such situations working memory demands are smaller than in referent-absent 
situations. Older, 20-month-old infants were able to reject categorically related objects as 
incorrect ones and reached again into the box for another object. This suggests that at this age 
infants are more advanced in their object category knowledge and word comprehension than at 
16 months. They no longer generalize common nouns to tokens of related categories. 
Study 1 findings also suggest that at 20 months infants have difficulty rejecting distractor 
objects that look similar to the mentioned targets. Twenty-month-old infants did not consistently 
reach back on distractor trials after having found objects that matched typical tokens of the 
mentioned categories by color and shape. This could have happened for one of 2 reasons: infants 
did not realize that the distractor objects were actually wrong, or they realized they were not the 
correct referents, but accepted them as “pretend” referents. Exploratory analysis of infants’ 
behavior may suggest that the first reason is more likely: the actions that infants sometimes 
produced on distractor objects (e.g., bouncing the apple, or biting the ball) revealed that they 
misinterpreted the objects’ category membership. Additionally, they sometimes mislabeled 
distractor objects. No matter which explanation is right, infants must activate perceptual features 
associated with typical tokens of the mentioned categories for this effect to be observed.  
A question that remains unanswered in Study 1 is whether infants’ search for hidden 
objects was guided by a mental representation associated with the mentioned category of objects 
or infants’ behavior was solely based on visual recognition of objects when they were present. It 
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is possible that infants initially reached into the box simply in response to the experimenter’s 
request to find an object and because they were trained to do this during the familiarization 
phase. They did not have a specific idea about what to search for in order to reach in the box. 
After having retrieved an object they could have decided if it was the right or a wrong object just 
by matching the experimenter’s label that was still in their memory with their recognition of that 
object. Additionally, on distractor trials infants’ reaching back for another object could have 
been guided by detecting a mismatch, and not by activating a representation associated with the 
experimenter’s label. Future research should address this question by using a different paradigm 
that would allow manipulating infants’ lexically derived mental representations and their visual 
object recognition. 
Study 2 findings suggest that infants starting at 20 months are able to keep track of 
people’s experiences with objects, and also can take into account the intonation of an ambiguous 
request to infer if a new or a familiar object is the intended referent. When an experimenter asked 
them ambiguously in a very excited way about one of the two balls that were present at the 
moment “Can you give it to me?” infants were able to interpret this ambiguous request as about 
the ball that was new to the experimenter. Younger, 16-month-old infants were not able to make 
such inference. When the request was made in a neutral way, infants at both ages failed to 
reliably infer that an old ball was meant.  
Older infants’ reliable selection of the new ball in the excited request condition suggests 
that at this age they are able to remember which person was familiar with which object. This 
finding is consistent with other research showing that infants at this age have access to the 
information about shared perceptual evidence. However, in previous research infants responded 
to ambiguous requests by selecting the new object for the researcher in some studies (Tomasello 
& Haberl, 2003; Moll, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2007), and selecting the old one in other studies 
(Liebal, Carpenter & Tomasello, 2010; Saylor & Ganea, 2007). The current research suggests 
that this discrepancy is likely due to infants’ ability to rely on the intonation of the person’s 
ambiguous request during reference resolution. Infants understand the difference between neutral 
and excited intonation. They consistently interpret excitement as directed at new objects, while 
the absence of excitement, or neutral intonation, does not by itself serve as a good clue for them 
that an old object is desired. Study 2 findings also demonstrate that infants generalize their 
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understanding of excitement as linked to seeing new objects to situations where the experimenter 
previously showed that the old object was highly desirable.  
Study 2 findings also add to the existing debate about the level of reasoning infants 
engage in when dealing with ambiguous reference. On one hand, young infants may understand 
others as intentional agents and interpret others’ behavior in terms of mental states and desires 
(Tomasello, 2000; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986) and use this knowledge in reference resolution. On 
the other hand, infants may just rely on associationistic and attentional processes to interpret 
ambiguous requests. They may be simply picking the object that was previously brought out by 
being introduced in a special context (see Samuelson & Smith, 1998, a response to Akhtar, 
Carpenter & Tomasello, 1996), or they may be going with the object that is most strongly 
associated with the requesting experimenter (Saylor & Ganea, 2007). Low-level associationistic 
and attentional accounts presuppose that infants think about only one object that is most salient 
during the test situation, and not consider all potential referents. This helps them reduce the 
ambiguity of the situation and thus allows them to pass the task. In the current research, both 
balls were introduced under the same circumstances. Additionally, infants could not have relied 
on their existing memory association between the requesting experimenter and one of the balls to 
pick the right ball in the excited request condition. They had to consider both referents and make 
an inference about which of the two balls the researcher was asking them about. By picking the 
new ball, 20-month-old infants demonstrated their ability to take the perspective of the speaker 
and deal with an ambiguous reference by relying on their understanding of people, of their 
preferences and desires.  
One question that remains unanswered in Study 2 is why 16-month-old infants failed to 
change their selection of the new or the familiar balls depending on the intonation of the request. 
Previous research has shown that infants are able to keep track of other’s experiences with 
objects from 12 months (Saylor, Ganea & Vazquez, 2011), and that they understand excitement 
as about new things before 16 months (Tomasello & Haberl, 2003). Sixteen-month-olds’ failure 
to infer which ball the experimenter meant in the current experiment could be explained by 
several possibilities. They may not be able to consider multiple referents at the same time and 
rely on their understanding of intonation as a cue to the requester’s preference, while in previous 
reference resolution tasks infants might have used low-level strategies to identify the correct 
referent. It is also possible that the current task was not manageable for infants of this age 
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because of the required working memory load. They had to keep track of two people and two 
objects at the same time, while the spatial cue that was found to be very important in Saylor and 
Ganea (2007) was removed. Without this assistance infants might have simply lost track of 
which ball was familiar to the requester. Therefore, future research should investigate younger 
infants’ use of intonation in reference resolution using more sensitive methods, or simpler 
procedures (for example, preferential looking or sequential touch procedures).  
Overall, across the two studies presented here it appears that infants between 16 and 20 
months of age move away from the simple associative nature of word comprehension to rely 
more on cognitively and socially sophisticated strategies in referential understanding. At 16 
months and older, infants are able to understand absent reference in a general categorical way, 
and their understanding is not limited to a particular object in its specific location. Between 16 
and 20 months are increasingly able to use their knowledge of objects and category labels to 
understand absent reference. By 20 months of age infants are also sensitive to the social 
component of linguistic interaction. When dealing with ambiguous reference situations they 
appear to be responsive to the speaker’s intention to refer to a particular object out of several 
possible ones, and they rely on the speaker’s intonation to read this intention. In general, infants’ 
representation of meaning is based on their knowledge of object categories, and their ability to 
identify the right referent among several possibilities is based on their understanding of people 
and their intentions. 
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APPENDIX A 
Chapter II: Frequencies of objects used as targets and distractors  
by age group and Experiment 
 
A1. Chapter II, Experiment 1: Frequency of items by trial type in the 20-month-old group 
(distractor objects were never mentioned by the experimenter). 
 
A2. Chapter II, Experiment 1: Frequency of items by trial type in the 16-month-old group 
(distractor objects were never mentioned by the experimenter) 
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A3. Chapter II, Experiment 2: Frequency of items by trial type in the 20-month-old group 
(distractor objects were never mentioned by the experimenter). 
 
A4. Chapter II, Experiment 2: Frequency of items by trial type in the 16-month-old group 
(distractor objects were never mentioned by the experimenter). 
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A5. Chapter II, Experiment 3: Frequency of items by trial type in the 20-month-old group 
(distractor objects were never mentioned by the experimenter). 
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APPENDIX B 
Chapter II, Experiments 2 and 3, Chapter III, Experiment 2: Pictures of stimuli 
 
B1. Stimuli used in Chapter II, Experiment 2 “Categorically related distractors” 
 
 
B2. Stimuli used in Chapter II, Experiment 3 “Perceptually similar distractors” 
 
 
B3. Stimuli used in Chapter III, Experiment 2  
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APPENDIX C 
Chapter III, Experiment 1: Room setup 
 
C1. Chapter III, Experiment 1: Room setup (ball introduction and test). E = experimenter, P = 
parent, i = infants. 
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